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Introduction 
 
The question how something like the mind can be purely physical is, in my opinion, perhaps 
the most fundamental question one can ask. It is a question that gives rise to many more 
questions about both the nature of the mind and the world, perhaps the most fundamental 
dichotomy in the human psychology. The question we are interested in answering in this 
thesis is a sub-question to the aforementioned, namely how can meaning be accounted for so 
that it is compatible with a physicalistic ontology? 
 
Jerry Fodor has tried to answer this question by investigating the nature of intentionality and 
representation. And, as we will see, it is by accounting for these notions in constructing a 
theory of the content of mental states that he aims to account for the question of meaning. I 
will in this thesis try to state what Fodor’s theory of content is, how Fodor’s account of 
content relates to other theories that are similar to his, what Fodor’s solution to the disjunction 
problem is and finally assessing Fodor’s theory as a whole. 
 
In the thesis we will focus on three pre-theoretical ideas, or intuitions we will require that 
Fodor’s theory satisfies to successfully have accounted for how meaning can be something 
physical. One intuition is about the physical, and the other two are about meaning. The 
intuition that is about the physical is one that is implied by our ontological conviction that 
everything that exists is physical. This requirement is thus that the theory must account for 
meaning in a way that is compatible with meaning’s being purely physical, and in what 
follows we will call this the naturalism requirement.  
 
The next intuition we will focus on is one that is about the nature of meaning. The intuition, in 
short, is that meaning is not a feature of things in general. Not everything exhibits meaning, 
and a theory of meaning that implies that meaning is everywhere is one that is not 
satisfactory. As we will see in part II, accounting for this intuition takes the form of showing 
that the theory does not imply what we will be calling pan-semanticism, i.e. the view that 
everything has meaning, or is meaningful. The final, and most important intuition the theory 
of meaning must respect, is the intuition of the robustness of meaning. This is the intuition 
that, say, the concept CAT means what it does regardless of what causes its occurrence.  
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As to the structure of the thesis we can note that it is composed of two parts with three 
chapters in each of the parts. Part I is about what naturalistic theories are and how they 
usually propose to solve the disjunction problem. The disjunction problem is the main 
problem in this thesis because it arises from how naturalistic theories try to account for the 
robustness of meaning. As accounting for the robustness of meaning is, in many ways, to 
solve the disjunction problem, the disjunction problem is considered in both part I and part II.  
 
Part II is about Fodor’s own solution to the disjunction problem. It is in this section that we 
will see what Fodor’s proposal amounts to, and here we will assess it in relation to some 
objections that have been proposed by Paul Boghossian. How Fodor accounts for the pan-
semanticism worry will also be considered in part II. As the title of the thesis indicates it is 
about Fodor’s theory of content. But for us to be able to properly asses Fodor’s theory we 
need to establish several key notions which will serve as the foundation for articulating 
Fodor’s theory. Part I is mainly about providing such a foundation, and Part II is thus the part 
where Fodor’s theory will be assessed.    
 
One can think of Fodor’s overall philosophical project as the project of securing a scientific 
basis for our common-sense psychology. That is to defend the common intuition that beliefs 
and desires and thoughts are real things that figure in our minds. It is because these things are 
real that one can say something true when one says “I went to the store because I wanted 
chocolate”. That one wanted chocolate is true, and it is the reason one went to the store. If one 
thinks that there are no such mental objects as wants then the explanation does not explain 
anything. Fodor’s theory is a commitment to the common-sense view that our theory about 
ourselves and other are largely correct and worth keeping. This is a view I am inclined to 
endorse. 
 
This thesis is about a part of Fodor’s project of securing a basis for common-sense 
psychology, namely the project of accounting for mental representation and thereby providing 
a foundation for meaning.     
 
Last, a word about terminology. I will try to follow existing conventions in formulating this 
theory. This means that when I mean to refer to a concept I will write it in caption, say, CAT; 
when I mean to refer to a word or sign I will mention it, say, “cat”; when I want refer to the 
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meaning or content of symbols or terms I will try to put it in italics , say, cat. Some mistakes 
are bound to happen, and for these I apologize.  
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Part I: 
 
1. Chapter I: Requirements on a Naturalistic Theory of Meaning 
 
 
Naturalism is the thesis that for God to create our world He needed only to have created the naturalistic 
entities and laws. Everything else follows from these. (Loewer, 1997, 108). 
 
This chapter is mainly about what features a theory must exhibit for it to satisfy the naturalism 
requirement. We will consider what relation naturalism has to the physicalistic doctrine, and 
try to specify a condition that, if satisfied, suffices for the theory to be naturalistic. As we 
noted in the introduction the theory aims to account for meaning by accounting for 
representation. The last part of this chapter will be about which naturalistic relation is likely to 
be able to constitute representation.  
 
1.1. Physicalism  
I suppose it is not inaccurate to say that most philosophers today are physicalists in some 
sense. The main competing view in the philosophy of mind, substance dualism, is not widely 
held to be true. There are variants of this view, as of any other view, and stronger and weaker 
commitments one can endorse. Some physicalists are physicalists in a strong sense and only 
believe in the existence of some or other basic particle type (e.g. quarks) and perhaps some of 
the forces (e.g. gravity). Others believe not only in micro objects but also in macro objects 
like mountains, horses and solar-systems. The latter are usually disposed to believe in the 
laws that govern the things they believe in, but this is not always so. 
 
Physicalism is a view that claims that everything that exists is physical. Fodor’s theory of 
content is physicalistic in the sense that it assumes a basic physicalistic framework, but he 
sometimes seems to reject certain parts of what physicalism is normally taken to be, 
something that is observed by commentators such as Barry Loewer and Georges Rey in the 
introduction to their book Meaning in Mind (Loewer and Rey, 1991). We will see later in the 
chapter what this means. Fodor’s views on the mental commit him to be a realist about mental 
states (Fodor, 1994, p. 3-4). He is committed to that psychological laws are real laws, which 
in turn imply that the properties they subsume are real properties (Fodor, 1994, p. 3). Since 
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these properties are intentional, Fodor is committed to being a realist about the intentional. 
The mental states we will be interested in in this dissertation are mental states that are 
representational, intentional and semantically evaluable. The first two deal with how mental 
states can be about other things (external objects, other thoughts, etc.). The latter is about how 
mental states can be true of false on account of the representational properties of themselves 
or their constituents. One type of mental states we will not be considering is the type of 
mental state that is commonly referred to as qualitative states, or qualia. In addition to qualia, 
we will not consider questions about the nature of consciousness.   
  
As physical beings we humans are, in principle, no different from stars and planets. The main 
problem for the physicalistically inclined philosopher of mind is the problem of making sense 
of the idea that the mental is not something radically different from the physical, or indeed, 
nothing but physical. Philosophers who are naturalistically inclined are often people who have 
great faith in the sciences. They think that science, in general, is mankind’s greatest 
achievement, and, I think, it is hard to disagree with them. So it is not surprising that it is 
often these philosophers who are interested in trying to account for the mind as part of nature. 
Physics is often assumed to have a key importance to philosophy. Physics is often taken to be 
a sort of default ontology where the sciences “bottom out”. So, to have a theory about 
something that in principle is incompatible with physics is, for a physicalist, to have a serious 
problem, and a theory that is incompatible with the sciences is a theory that is not naturalistic 
in the sense we are after. As we will see, one often assumes that the naturalization project and 
making a theory compatible with the sciences is one and the same project.   
 
1.2. Naturalism 
What exactly are naturalistic theories? What properties does a theory need to have to pass the 
tests of being naturalistic? When it comes to being the paradigm case of a naturalistic 
methodology, physics is it (Fodor, 1994, p. 5). Making a theory of the mind, or parts of the 
mind that is obviously compatible (when this means reducible) with physics is perhaps a tall 
order, but philosophy is not the only academic discipline that has trouble with reduction. 
Almost all the sciences, from chemistry through biology and to psychology and the social 
sciences have problems with reducing their theoretical terms to physical terms. There are 
several reasons for this. One reason is that even if one has established that some causal 
relation is a law, one has not thereby specified by what mechanism the law is implemented. 
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Let us take the Müller-Lyer illusion as an example. It is, we can assume, a psychological law 
that humans experience the lines as having different lengths when they in fact are the same 
length. What is the implementing mechanism in this case? It is presumably some neurological 
mechanism, but what it is and how it works, are not known. The failure to reduce its laws 
does not prevent psychology from being a science, and being one of the sciences its theories 
are naturalistically acceptable. Paul Boghossian (1991, p. 68) says, for instance, in a different 
context, that to specify something in terms of evolutionary biology is assumed to be sufficient 
for being naturalistic, and evolutionary biology is a special science in the required sense. 
Fodor says this about naturalizability in The Elm and the Expert (1994): 
 
… naturalizability, in this broad sense [i.e. not being specifically a demand upon intentionality], is a 
general constraint upon the ontology of all the special sciences. It’s a methodological consequence of 
our conviction – contingent, no doubt, but inductively extremely well confirmed – that everything the 
sciences talk about is physical. If that is so, then the properties that appear in scientific laws must be 
ones that it is possible for physical things to have, and there must be an intelligible story to tell about 
how physical things can have them. Geologists would have no right to assume that there are mountains 
but that they can provide, or anyhow foresee providing, or anyhow foresee no principled reason why 
someone couldn’t provide, naturalistic sufficient conditions for something physical to be a mountain. 
(Fodor, 1994, p. 5)      
 
What kind of relation is the mental required to have to the physical for it to be true that the 
mental be physical in this sense? Metaphysically, there are two choices that are viable: 
reduction and supervenience. Fodor (1994, p. 4) frames the relation in terms of reduction, and 
reduction is often framed in terms of strict identities. There is reason to believe that he does 
not mean reduction in this strict sense, since this risk implying an elimination of the mental 
from the theoretical vocabulary, something that is far from Fodor’s project. Boghossian 
(Boghossian, 1991, p. 65, 83) frames it in terms of supervenience. He defines a weak and a 
strong supervenience like so:  
 
A set of properties A weakly supervene on a set B, if no two objects in a given world could differ in 
their A properties without differing in their B properties. On the other hand, a set of properties A 
strongly supervene on set B, if no two objects drawn from any two worlds could differ in their A 
properties without differing in their B properties. (Boghossian, 1991, p. 83) 
 
It is safe to say that for a theory to be naturalistic it is required either to reduce to or supervene 
on the physical. 
  
It is easy to be confused when reading both Fodor and his commentators because they 
sometimes use these terms somewhat differently. For example, Fodor (1994, p. 4) says he 
assumes that his theory reduces to information, which as we will see, is a naturalistic notion. 
11 
 
Loewer and Rey (1991, p. 13), however, say that Fodor’s physicalism is non-reductive. They 
say some clarifying things about Fodor’s position in this passage from their book Meaning in 
Mind: 
 
Fodor’s version of physicalism is, however, considerably weaker than many traditional versions. In 
particular, it is non-reductive: there is no requirement that there be bi-conditional bridge laws linking 
the phenomena of some special science to the underlying phenomena of physics. Fodor views “special” 
sciences in general as searching for causal explanatory laws at the level appropriate to their subject 
matter, developing relatively autonomously from the deeper theories whose regularities they may cross-
classify. In the case at hand psychology may classify events as belonging to the same psychological 
type that differ in their neurophysiological properties, and neurophysiology might classify events 
belonging to the same neurological type that differ in their psychological properties. (Loewer and Rey, 
1991, p. xiii)  
 
The relationship between psychology and neurophysiology in this case is an example of what 
typically is meant by the multiple realizability of the mental, an intuition which is very 
important in the type/token -identity debate, a debate we will not go into here. We see that 
although Fodor is willing to commit to the view that every macro level property and other 
features of the world are fundamentally physical, he is not willing to commit to the type of 
physicalism that implies strict identities between mental and physical kinds. Reduction in the 
strong sense, i.e. that everything (every special science theory) ultimately will be expressible 
in some future complete physics, is one thing. The view that everything is ultimately physical 
is another.  
  
Fodor’s commitment to the existence of the properties and laws used in special sciences 
seems to be motivated by considerations about explanation, but also by considerations about 
causality. Fodor (Fodor, 1990, chapter 5) worries extensively that all properties other than 
those in the lexicon of physics are epiphenomenal. Part of his argument against the conclusion 
that intentional properties are epiphenomenal is that if they are, then so are all the special 
science properties also. Fodor argues for realism about all such properties on account of their 
causal responsibility in the laws they are subsumed by. It is a complex argument we will not 
review in detail here. It is acceptable, I think, to think that the world is ultimately composed 
of physical objects, and at the same time be skeptical about physics’ power to explain, say, 
economic phenomena. It is possible to have an ontology that is richer than that of basic 
physics without giving up physicalism, and Fodor includes many higher level properties and 
laws in his. In (Fodor, 1990, p. 93) he says this:  
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Ontologically speaking, I’m inclined to believe that it’s bedrock that the world contains properties and 
their nomic relations; i.e., that truths about nomic relations among properties are deeper that – and 
hence are not to be analyzed in terms of – counterfactual truths about individuals. In any event, 
epistemologically speaking, I’m quite certain that it’s possible to know that there is a nomic relation 
among properties but not have much idea which counterfactuals are true in virtue of the fact that the 
relation holds. It is therefore, methodologically speaking, probably a bad idea to require of philosophical 
analyses that are articulated in terms of nomic relations among properties that they be, as one says in the 
trade, “cashed” by analyses that are articulated in terms of counterfactual relations among individuals. 
(Fodor, 1990, p. 93-94) 
 
I include the whole of this paragraph because it sums up Fodor’s approach to several key 
ideas in philosophy nicely. In this thesis all of these ideas will be considered, but not all very 
comprehensively. However, they are important to mention because they are ideas that are 
constantly in the background of Fodor’s thinking. So, though we will not consider these ideas 
much explicitly, I think it is a good idea to have seen what Fodor takes his own key 
ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions to be. 
  
So, in sum we have seen that Fodor is not a reductionist in the strict sense, and, he explicitly 
endorses a realist view of intentional states like beliefs and desires and he is a realist about the 
theoretical properties of many special sciences, like “mountain” in geology (Fodor, 1990, p. 
139). The commitments Fodor has that we have reviewed are, I think, not all obviously 
compatible. Interesting as this is, I propose to leave this for now and turn to the question of 
what is required of a theory of representational content such as Fodor’s to be naturalistic.  
 
1.3. The Naturalism Condition  
Fodor says this in TOC: “[W]hat we want at a minimum is something of the form ‘R 
represents S’ is true iff C where the vocabulary in which condition C is couched contains 
neither intentional nor semantic expressions.” (Fodor, 1990, p. 32). There are several things 
worth noting in this formulation of the minimal requirement of a naturalistically acceptable 
theory. As we will see, it is the representation relation which does most of the work in the 
actual theory. That is Fodor’s account of how a mental representation, say a concept, relates 
to what it is about or represents. For Fodor, the assumption is that only symbols in the 
Language of Thought can represent, and that all other representation is derivative of this type 
of representation. On the informational approach, it is the relation between the individual 
symbols and the properties in the external world that are sufficient for causing them that 
constitutes the representation relation, and thus it is the representation relation that constitutes 
the relation between the mind and the world. The condition C is required to be a sufficient 
condition for the representation relation without itself being couched in semantical or 
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intentional terms. A specific taxonomy of which terms are intentional/semantical is not 
available, but as we will see, causal terms and terms that are included in stating laws and 
properties that enter into laws are allowed. Intuitively, what one cannot do is to appeal to 
terms that presuppose that you have already accounted for meaning in a theory that purports 
to account for meaning, as Fodor’s theory of content does. The naturalism condition is in 
many ways a demand on a theory not to be circular. 
 
Satisfying the reduction/supervenience requirement can be done by satisfying the requirement 
that the theory should be stated in non-intentional/non-semantical terms. Providing a 
sufficient condition for intentionality that is stated without presupposing that what the theory 
seeks to explain is tantamount to providing a reduction/supervenience base for intentionality; 
which is what accounts for all the features of intentionality. Since there are no unexplained 
features of intentionality that the reduction/supervenience base does not account for, the 
conditions for supervenience is fulfilled. This condition is met if the supervenience base is 
framed in non-intentional/non-semantic terms, and the supervenience base is indeed sufficient 
for what supervenes on it.  
 
1.4.  Intuitions about Meaning 
Fodor’s theory of content is a theory that aims to account for meaning. So, one can ask: How 
does one normally go about accounting for the meanings of terms? What are our intuitions 
about answers to questions of the type “what is the meaning of x”? When asked to give an 
explanation of the meaning of, say, the word “cat”, one usually tells a story about how cats 
are small, cute animals that have a number of legs and a tail and ears that are sort of triangular 
and.. etc. I think it is fairly intuitive that these types of explanations explain in virtue of 
exploiting the meaning relations between meaning bearing entities such as words or concepts. 
The mind is often assumed to be holistic in the sense that a concept means what it does in 
virtue of its place in a network of other concepts, or as a constituent in beliefs and the beliefs 
are individuated by their places in such networks. Fodor seems to think that this is the usual 
view. He says that “… on both sides of the English Channel, semantic holism is perhaps the 
characteristic philosophical doctrine of our time” (Fodor, 1994, p. 6). There are many variants 
of semantic holism, but all center around the idea that a given mental object gets its 
intentional/semantic status in virtue of its place in a network of other mental objects. Fodor 
opposes this tradition and thinks that theories about content should be atomistic. This is 
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because he thinks that holism implies that one cannot generalize over intentional objects and 
thus not have intentional laws (Fodor, 1994, p. 7). We will see in a later chapter that there are 
some difficulties with intentional atomism.   
  
Let us assume that the word “cat” expresses the concept CAT. The similarities between 
specifying the meaning of CAT and individuating CAT are striking and in much of the debate 
this seems to taken to be the same. To individuate something usually implies saying what it is 
that makes something unique, often by specifying something that is true of only one 
individual. Something is individuated if the characteristics used to identify it yields one result, 
i.e. the individual one wish to individuate. It is important to note that types, and not only 
individuals, also can be individuated by this criterion, though types and kinds often resist 
individuation by definition. In the common-sense example with CAT, we individuate the 
concept by giving a sort of description or definition that we use to single out the concept from 
all the other concepts. As we saw above, we can do so by specifying CAT’s relation to other 
concepts. There is a question whether theories that individuate contents holistically can be 
naturalistic in the sense we require, namely without employing intentional/semantical terms. 
The worry is that one needs to specify the contents of some beliefs to establish the relations 
that determine the contents of the other beliefs. There is also the worry that such a 
specification of content will, if it is to be naturalistic, imply an analytic/synthetic distinction 
because one arguably needs stable, necessary relations between some beliefs in order to 
specify the rest. These relations will then constitute relations that are necessary in virtue of the 
meanings of the contents, and that is tantamount to saying that some relations between 
contents are true in virtue of meaning, i.e. being analytically true. Philosophers who 
sympathize with Quine will naturally resist such a conclusion.  
 
We have so far reviewed some criteria for what Fodor calls condition C. We have seen that 
most importantly it must be stated without employing intentional/semantical terms. This is 
because, to be naturalistic, it must supervene on something non-intentional/non-semantic that 
is sufficient for it. Fodor does not think he is obliged to provide a necessary condition for 
representation, only a sufficient one (Fodor, 1990, p. 96). The natural question to ask is what 
Fodor’s sufficient condition for representation is. Let us now turn to this question.  
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1.5.  Resemblance and Causation 
We remember that Fodor calls the sufficient condition for representation for C. What kind of 
non-semantic/non-intentional framework will satisfy C? Fodor considers two: resemblance 
and causation (1990, p. 33). It is important to remember here that the relation to be constituted 
by C is the representation relation. It is the representation relation that will serve as the main 
constituent of the theory of meaning and intentionality that Fodor proposes. This is important 
because this relation in and of itself does not suffice for explaining higher order mental 
phenomena such as thought or consciousness. Fodor argues against the view that 
representation is to be accounted for in terms of resemblance, very convincingly I think. We 
will review his arguments because the reasons why resemblance is inadequate tell us a lot 
about what kind of relation representation is taken to be.  
 
Fodor first considers the proposal that representation can be accounted for in terms of 
resemblance. The proposal is something like this: The idea of a horse is an idea of a horse 
because it in some way resembles a horse. Generally we can say that the idea of X manages to 
be about Y (or mean Y) in virtue of its relation to Y. This is representation when the 
representation relation is framed as a resemblance relation, where resemblance presumably 
amounts to having features in common. Fodor considers three problems with this proposal 
(1990, p. 33-34), all of which seem to be fatal:  (i) It is not clear what it means to say that an 
idea resembles what it is about. Resemblance seems to be about sharing properties, or having 
properties that are in the same categories. The fact that pictures resemble the objects they are 
of seems to suggest that not many properties need to be common at all for something to 
resemble something else. After all, a property like weight seems to have no impact on how 
pictures resemblance. On the other hand, a property like geometric shape seems to be 
essential, at least in visual resemblance. The point is that it is hard to imagine what property 
an idea should share with what it is about such that the result is that they resemble. Weight 
seems to be out of the question. Geometric shape might be conceivable, at least for simple 
geometric shapes. It is conceivable that the idea of a triangle could be realized in a triangular 
manner in the brain, but what about the idea “the biggest prime number”?  
 
(ii) Representation seems to be a non-symmetrical relation. A sign represents a property 
without the property representing the sign. “Tiger” seems to be about tigers, but tigers don’t 
seem to be about “Tiger”s. Contrary to representation, resemblance is a symmetrical relation, 
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i.e. if X resembles Y, then Y resembles X. Representation does not have this feature so 
resemblance cannot be representation. (iii) Representation can be singular, i.e. that a sign can 
represent an individual object. Resemblance cannot capture this feature of representation 
because individual objects resemble each other and if resemblance is sufficient for 
representation, a sign X that represents object Y in virtue of X resembling Y, will also 
represent Z if Z resembles Y. Again, this is a feature not shared with representation. The sign 
this tiger will represent a unique tiger. Since tigers resemble each other this tiger should 
represent the other tigers too, but it doesn’t (Fodor, 1990, p. 33-34). We can conclude that 
resemblance does not seem to be sufficient for representation.  
 
These arguments point to features of representation which must be shared by whatever 
relation is to constitute representation. Causal relations are the obvious choice. Fodor says:  
 
Causal relations are natural relations if anything is. You might wonder whether resemblance is part of 
the natural order (or, whether it’s only, as it were, in the eye of the beholder). But to wonder that about 
causation is to wonder whether there is a natural order. (Fodor, 1990, p. 33)  
 
Unlike resemblance which, as we saw, has problems being what we need for representation, 
causal relations seem to have the features needed to constitute representation. Also, in 
determining what conditions a theory of intentionality must meet to be considered naturalistic 
we saw that being specifiable in non-semantic/non-intentional terms is paramount. Framing 
condition C in terms of causal relations seems to satisfy this condition.  
 
We have so far discussed how to establish naturalistic criteria for a theory of meaning and 
intentionality when we have understood naturalism as being something similar to physicalism. 
We have seen that it is the representation relation which is to constitute the relation between 
the Mind and the World. It is the relation that is the foundation of intentionality, and the 
relation that is to constitute the basis for a naturalistic theory of meaning. We have seen that 
the representation relation needs to satisfy one condition, namely to be specifiable in non-
intentional/non-semantic terms. This is to be done by framing it in terms of causal relations. 
But how are causal relations supposed to be able to reconstruct meaning and intentionality? 
To make sense of this idea, Fodor turns to the informational theories of meaning. Information, 
as we will see in the next chapter, is a notion which is naturalistic in the required sense, and a 
notion that can be used to construct the representation relation. The theme for the next chapter 
is the informational theory, and how information can be thought to constitute representation. 
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2. Chapter II: Information and Causation  
 
 
In the previous chapter we tried to specify what features a theory of content needs to have in 
order to qualify as a naturalistic theory. That the theory should be framed in terms that are not 
themselves semantic or intentional we found to be the fundamental requirement. We saw that 
there are reasons to believe that the requirement that the theory should make content 
supervenient on, or reducible to, non-semantic/non-intentional features of the world will be 
fulfilled by framing the theory in non-semantic/non-intentional vocabulary.  
 
This chapter is about the information relation and how this can be exploited in a theory of 
meaning such as Fodor’s. We will start by considering what we will take information to be. 
This we will do by considering Dretske’s theory of information, and how Fodor understands 
it. We will address the issue of ceteris paribus laws, an issue that is important in 
understanding what types of generalizations we use to express information relations. We will 
also see what relation information has to meaning, and some of the problems that arise when 
one tries to construct the latter out of the former. Let us first review some challenges to the 
way of doing semantics that we considered in the previous chapter.   
 
2.1. Holism 
As we have seen, and as Fodor admits, there are other approaches to semantics more popular 
than Fodor’s approach of informational semantics (1994, p. 6). The chief alternative is the 
view that is called semantic holism, which is implied by conceptual-role theories of meaning 
(Fodor, 1994, p. 6). Fodor defines semantic/intentional holism’s characterizing feature like 
this:  
 
Nothing can exhibit any intentional properties unless it exhibits many intentional properties; the  
metaphysically necessary conditions for a thing’s being in any intentional state include its being in 
many other intentional states. (Fodor, 1990, p. 51).  
 
It is important to note that, according to Fodor (1990, p. 51), there is no reason to believe that 
something cannot be both holistic and physicalistic, so Fodor’s reservations about holism are 
not motivated by naturalistic concerns. What Fodor claims is rather that having a holistic 
theory of intentionality would preclude having a scientific, intentional psychology. He also 
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says that the philosophers who are semantic holists often end up being semantic eliminativists 
(1994, p. 6), and that is obviously not an alternative for Fodor who is a realist about the 
intentional. 
 
Why is holism a threat to intentional realism? What about holism makes it impossible to hold, 
for Fodor, without giving up intentional realism? It seems that, because of Quine’s argument 
against the principled distinction between analytic and synthetic truths (For Fodor, at least, 
this is what Quine argued (Fodor, 1990, p. 52)), any intentional kind, if it is individuated by 
reference to other intentional kinds, cannot be subsumed by intentional laws, with the 
consequence that there are no intentional laws. This is what Fodor says:  
 
One important way that psychological laws achieve generality is by quantifying over all the organisms 
that are in a specified mental state (all the organisms that believe that P, or intend that Q, or whatever). 
But holism implies that very many intentional states must be shared if any of them are. So the more 
holistic the mind is, the more similar the mental lives of two organisms (or two time slices of the same 
organism) have to be in order that the same psychological laws should subsume them both. At the limit 
of holism, two minds share any of their intentional states only if they share all of them. And since, of 
course, no two minds ever do share all of their intentional states, the more [holism] is true the more the 
putative generalizations of intentional psychology fail, de facto, to generalize. (Fodor, 1990, p. 51-52) 
 
It seems that Fodor thinks that holism, unless you assume an analytic/synthetic distinction, is 
subject to a slippery-slope type argument that shows that for two individuals to share an 
intentional state, they are required to share all intentional states. This is, of course, 
unacceptable. 
 
2.2. The Informational Theory 
Of the theories that claim to be able to account for meaning in non-intentional/non-semantic 
terms, and are therefore naturalistic, informational theories are what are taken to be the best 
option. I will start by sketching Dretske’s theory of information. Once I have done this I will 
consider what version of the informational theory Fodor uses in formulating his theory. The 
best known account of informational semantics is perhaps Fred Dretske’s account in 
Knowledge and the Flow of Information (1981). Dretske wants to give an account that can 
serve as a bridge between the cognitive sciences and computer sciences on the one hand and 
philosophy on the other. The way to do this is to specify a notion that is not 
intentional/semantical and use that in stating a condition for content. This notion is, of course, 
Information. In the preface to the book Dretske says this about information: 
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Once this distinction is clearly understood [between meaning and information], one is free to think 
about information (though not meaning) as an objective commodity, something whose generation, 
transmission, and reception do not require or in any way presuppose interpretive processes. One is 
therefore given a framework for understanding how meaning can evolve, how genuine cognitive 
systems – those with the resources for interpreting signals, holding beliefs, and acquiring knowledge – 
can develop out of lower-order, purely physical, information processing mechanisms. The higher-level 
accomplishments associated with intelligent life can then be seen as manifestations of progressively 
more efficient ways of handling and coding information. Meaning, and the constellations of mental 
attitudes that exhibit it, are manufactured products. The raw material is information. (Dretske: 1981: vii) 
 
I think this exemplifies nicely what the project of naturalizing the mind can consist of. 
Though there are several theoretical alternatives one can choose from, where Dretske’s is but 
one, this passage captures the ambition of the project as a whole, I think. In characterizing 
information as “an objective commodity, something whose generation, transmission, and 
reception do not require or in any way presuppose interpretive processes,” he, says, in effect, 
that information is the notion we need to naturalize the mind. So, we will henceforth take 
information to be the notion that will satisfy the naturalization requirement, or, in Fodor’s 
terms: the notion in terms of which we will state condition C. 
 
The notion of information that Dretske employs is a quantitative notion, it is something that is 
measured in bits (Dretske, 1981, p. 3). Systems that can be in informational states, and signals 
that convey information about what caused them, are purely physical systems and signals. In 
this sense, information is everywhere where there is causation and the effect carries 
information about its cause. In what follows I will mostly rely on Fodor’s exposition of 
Dretske’s position and what Fodor himself takes information to be in a Theory of Content 
(1990). Let us look at a classic example of an information relation, namely the thermometer: 
A thermometer is a device we use to measure ambient temperature in a variety of 
circumstances, e.g. when we want to find out if the roast is cooked properly, if it is hot 
enough for swimming or if one should put gloves on when going out for a walk, etc. The 
thermometer serves this purpose in that it manages to represent the surrounding temperature 
in a way we have found to be reliable. The relationship we exploit in making thermometers is 
the causal relationship between mercury and the surrounding temperature. Mercury, we have 
discovered, expands in volume in a regular manner when the surrounding temperature goes 
up, and lessens in volume when it goes down. In making a scale on a glass column that 
contains mercury we can keep track of what the temperature is. We can know this because the 
causal relationship between mercury and temperature is of a particular kind.  
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Fodor considers thermometers in (1990, p. 44).  First, a thermometer is a device that 
represents one property of the ambient medium (mean energy distribution) with another 
property of the mercury (volume). Both the ambient medium and the mercury have other 
properties that engage causally with each other and it is not, from an informational 
perspective, given that it is these two properties that are so related, i.e., that the volume of the 
mercury represents the temperature. That a thermometer represents temperature is dependent 
on other facts of the situation like that the vacuum in the tube that contains the mercury is 
intact, and so on. Secondly, the thermometer acts in this way because it is a device for 
representing the temperature. Most thermometers do this because they were designed to do 
this by a designer who had an intention of making the thermometer do just that. However, 
though thermometers need a designer to be such as to represent the temperature, the causal 
relation the thermometer exploits needs no such designer.  
 
The point is this: even though a thermometer needs a designer to enable the property V 
represent the property T, what makes this representation possible is the underlying 
informational relationship between mercury and the ambient gas. Dretske calls this 
digitalization. He says: “The most specific piece of information the signal carries (about s) is 
the only piece of information it carries (about s) in digital form. All other information (about 
s) is coded in analog form.” (Dretske, 1981, p. 137). Digitalization is the ability some systems 
have of reducing information in a signal and representing the information as a relation 
between singular properties. The simplest example is a system that can represent things as 
being on or off. The light on the dashboards of cars that represent the oil-level is typically of 
this kind (Dretske, 1981, p. 136). Though the physical system of the engine is a complex one 
and the mechanism that is the route for the information about the oil level has many different 
states each representing the amount of oil, the endpoint is a lamp that is either on or off. The 
simple property of the lamp’s being off represents the complex property of the engine as 
having sufficient oil. The simple property of the lamp’s being on represents the corresponding 
property of the engine’s not having enough oil.     
 
Dretske introduces several of what he calls levels of intentionality (Dretske, 1981, p. 172-
173).The semantic level is level three. There are, in other words, two levels of information 
that are not semantical levels. It seems that Dretske introduces these levels as an attempt to 
say what characterizes the systems that are merely informational systems, and those that are 
truly cognitive, i.e., capable of entertaining beliefs. The difference between the two seems to 
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be that while informational systems cannot distinguish properties that are nomically or 
analytically, as he says, connected, cognitive systems can (Dretske, 1981, p. 171-175). That is 
to say that a signal that carries the information that s is F when s is F logically implies that s is 
G, also carries the information that s is G. The fact that s is G is “nested” in s’ being F.  
Cognitive systems have the ability to distinguish the Gs from the Fs. An example may be that 
someone might represent s as being triangular without representing s as trilateral, though 
these properties are necessarily co-extensional. This is a feature of mentality which is hard for 
informational theories to account for. The ability to represent things as more fine-grained than 
things are in the world is one of the features for which a theory of this kind needs to account. 
This is something we will consider below when we consider the Frege cases.  
 
2.3.  Fodor’s Account of Information and Symbols 
Fodor does not explain exactly what he takes informational theories to be. He assumes that a 
theory of information that is naturalistic in the required sense can be given (Fodor, 1994, p. 
4), so he doesn’t worry much about the details, with the exception of how Dretske deals with 
the disjunction problem, which is the theme of the next chapter. But first, let us see how 
Fodor uses the information relation in his own theory. Fodor takes this to be the basic idea of 
Dretske’s:  
 
“S-events (e.g., tokenings of symbols) express the property P if the generalization ‘Ps 
cause Ss’ is counterfactual supporting”. (Fodor, 1990, p. 57)  
   
This formulation is different from the way the informational theory is formulated in several 
important respects. First, instead of the relation “S carries information about P”, Fodor says 
“S expresses the property P”. To say of a symbol that it expresses a property might be read as 
introducing a semantic term. This is not what is happening. “Expressing a property” is here 
taken as a technical term replacing the “information” term used by Dretske. “Expressing a 
property” is here read as wholly constituted by the causal generalization linking the property 
and the sign.  
 
This formulation is in essence an answer to the question of how information, something that is 
not in and of itself digitalized, can link particular properties with the particular representations 
that express them. As we saw in the thermometer case this is difficult to do without assuming 
22 
 
a designer. Assuming a designer is, of course, not a viable option in a naturalistic theory. This 
definition is an attempt to give such an answer. The condition is formulated as a conditional. 
That means that ‘the generalization “Ps cause Ss” is counterfactual supporting’ is a sufficient 
condition for some S-event to express the property P. And, to say that a causal generalization 
is counterfactual supporting is in essence to say that it expresses a law. Laws are the only 
things that are counterfactual supporting in the sense we are after here. We can say that if 
there is a law that Ps cause Ss, we have a nomological relation that is sufficient for the symbol 
S to express the property P. Let us turn to the notion of a symbol and try to understand what is 
meant by that. 
 
The term “symbol”, as it is normally used, covers a wide range of applications, from how it is 
used in logic, to generally how words and sentences are said to be symbols. In daily life we 
also encounter other types of symbols. In fact, symbols are abundant in modern societies, 
most we hardly notice consciously since their occurrence is so natural to us. Typical examples 
are traffic signs, the use of the color red as a warning, various drawings that depict what 
situations we might get ourselves into if we are not careful, e.g., an avalanche or the like. We 
can also use the term when we say that Gandhi, for example, is a symbol of peace or 
tolerance. In order not to be question-begging the definition of the “expressing a property”-
relation cannot imply that only a certain type of Ss can be symbols. This would be the case if 
it turns out that only mental symbols are candidates for being Ss, for example. As it stands the 
definition is wholly general and includes everything that can be subsumed by causal 
generalizations. As we will see later in chapter 4, to naturalistically specify what constitutes 
symbol-hood is not something Fodor does, and this poses some challenges for Fodor in 
avoiding that his theory implies pan-semanticism.  
 
Something that is interesting to us is that what S expresses is a property. This might not be 
surprising, but it is not obvious that naturalistic accounts have properties so readily available. 
Causation is often something that is thought of as a relation among particulars. This was, as 
we saw, one of the virtues of the causal theory of representation as opposed to the 
resemblance theory of representation. But causation is, on this picture, a relation particulars 
have to each other in virtue of what properties they instantiate. This is why we can have laws 
that quantify over particulars, i.e., this is why particulars are subsumed by laws. This is so 
because particular properties are satisfiable by indefinitely many particulars, and it is this non-
local or abstract feature of properties that enables generalizations to generalize in the first 
23 
 
place. The ontological status of properties engenders exciting questions, but since we have 
seen that Fodor assumes that laws and properties are more fundamental than the individuals 
that instantiate them, we will not consider the matter in any detail here. Since the constituting 
relation of content is stated as a law, let us now consider what we take laws to be, in particular 
ceteris paribus laws.  
 
2.4. Ceteris Paribus Laws 
Special science laws typically involve macro level properties. Science taken as a whole is a 
pretty heterogeneous affair. The properties and laws that figure in the special sciences can 
cover the same cases but give different predictions and different explanations for phenomena 
and in this sense be theoretically incompatible. For example, the phenomenon of global 
urbanization might be explained very differently, and perhaps even be given conflicting 
explanations by economics and social science, respectively. Special science laws are not 
considered universal in the same sense that the laws of physics are taken to be. Usually, this is 
expressed by saying that special science laws are ceteris paribus laws. What the best way of 
understanding this qualification is is very much debated, and there is, as far as I know, no 
consensus. It seems that the ceteris paribus condition expresses that in some cases the 
antecedent of the law can be satisfied and the consequent not be true, though this does not 
mean that the law is false. Special science laws are in an important way domain specific. 
Unlike physical laws, which apply whenever, and where ever, it is assumed, special science 
laws do not. There can be circumstances that the domain of the law simply does not capture, 
even though the antecedent of the law is satisfied. 
 
One example, one we mentioned above, and one we will come back to later, (Fodor, 1990, p. 
155) can be the geological law that describes how the water erodes the riverbanks of a river. If 
suddenly, and certainly by magical means, a layer of diamond were to be placed on the whole 
of the banks and bed of the river, the erosion would cease though all the elements of the law’s 
antecedent is satisfied.  
 
Ceteris paribus laws are metaphysically unappealing since they represent a softening of the 
term ‘sufficient’. The antecedent of a true conditional is considered to be sufficient for its 
consequent, though in ceteris paribus laws this is not the case. Perhaps this can be accounted 
for by an appeal to the internal consistency of the special science, and that when the ceteris 
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paribus condition is violated the violation should come from without of the domain of the 
special science in question. This is a complex way of saying that ceteris paribus laws can be 
cancelled by factors outside its domain. As we will see in the quote below, they have 
conditions that need to be satisfied for them to apply without exception. The problem with 
such conditions is that it is very hard to know exactly what the conditions are, and when they 
are satisfied. Fodor says this about ceteris paribus laws: 
 
On the one hand, it’s intrinsic to a law being hedged [being a ceteris paribus law] that it is 
nomologically possible for its ceteris paribus conditions not to be satisfied. And, on the other hand, a 
standard way to account for the failure of a ceteris paribus condition is to point to the breakdown of an 
intervening mechanism. Thus, meandering rivers erode their outside banks ceteris paribus. But not when 
the speed of the river is artificially controlled (no Bernoulli effect); and not when the river is chemically 
pure (no suspended particles); and not when somebody has built a wall on the outside bank (not enough 
abrasion to overcome adhesion). In such cases, the ceteris paribus fails to be satisfied because an 
intervening mechanism fails to operate. By contrast, this strategy is unavailable in the case of nonbasic 
laws; basic laws don’t rely on mechanism of implementation, so if they have exceptions that must [be] 
because they’re nondeterministic. (Fodor, 1990, p. 155) 
 
Why is it important for Fodor to account for ceteris paribus laws? The reason is this: 
Psychological laws are special science laws and therefore ceteris paribus laws. If ceteris 
paribus laws cannot be accounted for properly there is no reason for supposing that they are 
real laws, only generalizations awaiting reduction to physical laws. For Fodor, who is a realist 
about properties figuring in special science laws, this is not a good result. 
 
We have considered the notion of information and seen some examples of what kind of 
relation it is a notion of, and that it satisfies the condition for being naturalistic. We have also 
seen that Fodor frames the information relation in terms of a symbol “expressing a property”. 
The information relation is thus taken to be a relation between a symbol and a property. This 
relation takes the form of a law and is thus counterfactual supporting. So, to sum up: the 
naturalistic relation that is to constitute the representation-relation is the relation between 
property and symbol in a causal law. Let us see how Fodor thinks this relation can reconstruct 
meaning and consider some problems with this approach: in particular what Fodor calls the 
Frege cases. Fodor’s solution to the Frege cases is something we will not consider in detail 
because he solves the problem another way, one that is dependent on, the one we are 
considering here. But the Frege cases are generally a set of cases a theory of meaning must 
account for, so it is good to have reviewed them, I think.   
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2.5. Information and Meaning 
What is the relation between information and meaning? We have seen that Fodor constructs 
the relation “expressing a property” from the information relation. As we shall see, the 
“expressing a property” -relation is actually insufficient in determining the content of a mental 
symbol. The reason for this is, as we mentioned above in the example of the triangular and the 
trilateral, the fine-grainedness of the mental. What this means is that contents and individual 
mental states can be individuated more finely than the objects that are in the extensions of the 
predicates. This is what Fodor refers to as the Frege cases (1994, p. 22). The Frege cases are a 
series of difficulties that have to do with how predicates can be co-extensive but nevertheless 
be non-synonymous. In accounting for meaning in naturalistic terms, one needs a naturalistic 
criterion that manages to break the connection between these types of predicates. The problem 
is inherent in what theoretical vocabulary one has available. Let’s look at an example, the pair 
of predicates “triangular” and “trilateral”. They are necessarily co-extensive, we can assume.  
 
The problem for the informational approach is that we want to equate meaning with 
extension, by means of causation. We can say that what is responsible for a predicate’s 
meaning is the causal relationship between tokenings of the symbol and the property the 
predicate expresses. So, a particular dog is responsible for tokenings of the mental symbol 
“dog” in virtue of being something that instantiates the property dog-hood.  
 
2.6. Frege Cases  
There are, in particular, two main problems for naturalized semantics: The Frege cases, and 
the Twin Earth cases. The Twin Earth cases we will get back to in a later chapter. Both cases 
are familiar from the philosophy of language. A standard Frege case (Fodor, 1994, p. 22) is 
the case where someone might believe that the Morningstar is remote but fail to believe that 
the Evening star is. But, “Morningstar” and “Evening Star” are names for the same object, so 
both names co-refer. If the meaning of a term is wholly determined by its extension then 
Morningstar and Evening Star should be synonymous, with the result that the beliefs are 
identical in meaning. The fact that this is not the case is what needs to be accounted for. The 
informational story is such that it aims to construct the meaning of a predicate by reference to 
its extension, where the extension is identified by what is sufficient for causing tokens of the 
predicate. The problem with both the Frege cases and the Twin Earth cases is that this strategy 
does not produce what we intuitively think of as the correct meanings of the terms. Thus it 
26 
 
seems that individuating extensions is insufficient for individuating meaning. This is evident 
from the fact that “Morningstar” and “Evening star” mean different things even though they 
have the same extension. We will examine this problem more closely in the case with the frog 
and the fly later. But let us first briefly consider an example which is intuitively more 
problematic than the example with the Evening star and the Morningstar.  
  
There are expressions which, though they differ in meaning, are necessarily co-referring, or 
co-extensional. “Triangular” and “Trilateral” is such a pair. This means that every possible 
object one can predicate the one to, one can also predicate the other to. The problem is to 
individuate the meanings naturalistically other than by individuating the extensions, since we 
have seen that this strategy fails. One approach can be to appeal to the mental analogue of the 
compositionality of natural languages. That is, in effect, to try to make an account about how 
neither “trilateral” or “triangular”, though they have the same extensions, are primitive 
expressions, i.e., they can be divided into their component parts, and when this is done it is 
seen that the component parts do not have the same extensions, and hopefully that will 
explain how their meaning differs. Fodor seems to try some such approach (see below). We 
will not go into this strategy in detail but I think some variant of this approach can intuitively 
seem promising, at least for these kinds of terms. The proposal conforms to the intuition that 
the reason the predicates differ in meaning is that though they refer to the same geometric 
object, they refer to different parts of that object, and it is that that accounts for the difference 
in meaning. When the “tri” component is removed it is immediately seen that “lateral” and 
“angular” are not co-extensive. This move is permitted only if one introduces something like a 
principled distinction between basic and non-basic predicates. There is perhaps a case to be 
made for that someone who has the concepts TRILATERAL and TRIANGULAR in their 
basic, primitive, non-composite versions, if this is even possible, they will necessarily have 
the same content on account of their extensions. Fodor says this about how he tries to solve 
the problem posed by the Frege cases:  
 
Propositional attitudes are relations between creatures, propositions and modes of presentation. None of 
the three is dispensable if a propositional attitude is to be specified uniquely. That’s because modes of 
presentation are sentences (of Mentalese), and sentences are individuated not just by their propositional 
content but also by their syntax. The identity of their content does not make wanting to marry M the 
same desire as wanting to marry J, any more than their synonymy makes “John is a bachelor” the same 
sentence as “John is an unmarried man.” (Fodor 1994, p. 47-48)    
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The example Fodor is referring to in this paragraph is the example of Oedipus who by 
accident married his mother (M). This happened because he did not know that Jocasta (J), 
whom he did want to marry, was identical to his mother, whom he didn’t want to marry. We 
will not consider in detail this way of solving the Frege cases, i.e. by appealing to the syntax 
of mentalese sentences. The reason for this is that to account for Fodor’s solution to this 
problem will take us to far from his proposal for accounting for the disjunction problem. The 
problem we will focus on is the Twin Earth problem as a case of the disjunction problem.  
  
We have seen that for Fodor there are two main types of problems, the Twin cases (which we 
will discuss later) and the Frege cases. Fodor articulates them as the two ways broad contents 
and computational implementations might come unstuck (Fodor, 1994, p. 22). Broad content 
is a type of externally individuated content, a type of content we will consider in general in 
the discussion of the Twin Earth cases in chapter 5. The commonalities between both these 
types of problems are that they both arise out of the close link between content and extension. 
Both Frege cases and Twin Earth cases loosen the connection between content and extension, 
for both exemplify how content and extension come apart. The way we have been telling the 
informational story, it is the equation of content with extension, and extension with whatever 
causes the sign that is the relation that constitutes the “S expresses P” relation. As we will see 
in the next chapter when we consider what Fodor calls “the disjunction problem” it is the 
equation of the extension of a predicate (sign) with what is sufficient for causing it that is the 
root of the problem for the informational theory.          
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3. Chapter III: The Disjunction Problem 
 
 
As we have seen there are challenges for informational semantics. Fodor’s way of expressing 
the idea by substituting the informational relation with the “express the property” relation is 
an interesting suggestion since this way of formulating it makes explicit the connection 
between symbols and properties. We have seen that the problems arise from the restrictions 
placed upon the theory from its commitment to naturalism, and its attempt to construct 
content from the causal relation between the sign and what is sufficient for causing the sign. 
The terms “meaning” and “content” will sometimes in what follows be used to express the 
same idea. The disjunction problem is a problem about how informational semantics can 
account for error. Since informational theories such as the one we are considering are theories 
of representation the problem of error translates into being the problem of allowing for 
misrepresentation. This problem must be solved if Fodor is to account for one of the main 
intuitions we have about meaning, namely the intuition that meaning is robust. This, as we 
have mentioned, is the intuition that a term, or symbol, means what it does regardless of what 
caused its occurrence. In this chapter we will try to formulate what exactly the disjunction 
problem is and review some proposed solutions: Dretske’s proposal and the 
historical/teleological theory’s proposal. We will then see Fodor’s arguments for why both 
these proposals fail to solve the disjunction problem. This will prepare us for Fodor’s own 
proposal which we will consider in the next chapter. 
  
3.1.  Misrepresentation 
The disjunction problem is a problem inherent in causal/informational theories. Fodor 
expresses it in the following way:  
 
[C]ausal theories have trouble distinguishing the conditions for representation from the conditions for 
truth. This trouble is intrinsic; the conditions that causal theories impose on representation are such that, 
when they’re satisfied, misrepresentation cannot, by that very fact, occur. (Fodor, 1990, p. 34).  
 
The problem arises from the relationship between predicate, property and the conditions for 
when the predicate expresses the property. Fodor expresses this idea by using the pair of 
terms “representation” and “truth”. The representation relation, as we have seen, is 
constructed in terms of the predicate expressing the property. Fodor’s idea of representation is 
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that a mental representation is a tokening of a syntactic sign in a Language of Thought (LOT) 
(1990, p. 16). A syntactic sign in the LOT is what Fodor thinks of as what implements the S 
in “S expresses the property P”, and the “expresses the property” relation is what constitutes 
the representational relation. We will often in what follows call S a predicate, and the relation 
as a predicate expressing a property.  
  
Intuitively put, the disjunction problem arises from the feature of informational theories that 
says that the extension of a predicate is determined by what is sufficient for causing the token 
of the predicate (sign). The predicate expresses (means) the property that is the sufficient 
cause of the predicate. In sum, we can say that the predicate means whatever is sufficient for 
causing it. Let us look at an example. We are assuming that having the concept, DOG, say, 
involves having a symbol in a LOT that means dog, i.e. expresses the property dog-hood. The 
question is: What determines the content of the mental symbol? The informational theory’s 
answer is: the causal relation the sign has with whatever is sufficient for causing it. We are 
supposing that in the mind we are imagining there is a tokening of the concept DOG. What 
determines the content of this concept? It is the concepts causal relationship with dogs. This is 
to say that DOG expresses the property dog-hood because dog-hood is a sufficient cause for 
DOG. This is the informational explanation of how something has meaning. Now, this gives 
rise to an obvious problem as we will see in what follows. 
 
It can be retorted to the informational theorist, “there are surely other properties that are 
sufficient for causing DOG tokens. What about cases where we make mistakes?” 
Misrepresentation happens when something other than what is in the extension of DOG 
causes a DOG token. This happens when someone, for example, sees a wolf and mistakes it 
for a dog due to the distance to the wolf. Or, when someone sees a sheep from far away and 
mistakes it for a dog. Mistakes like these are common. The problem is that the representation 
relation is supposed to be sufficient condition for meaning. Why DOG means what it does is 
explained by the nomological relation between tokens of DOG and whatever causes it. It 
seems obvious that equating the extension of DOG with whatever is sufficient for causing 
DOG is not going to explain why DOG means dog, and not something else. As the example 
shows, the property of being a wolf can be sufficient for causing DOG tokens. That means 
that the informational theory implicates that wolves and dogs are in the extension of DOG. So 
we can express the extension of DOG as “dog or wolf” because both dogs and wolves are 
sufficient for causing DOG. This is why the problem is called the disjunction problem, 
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namely because the informational theory ascribes disjunctive extensions to predicates that do 
not have disjunctive extensions. The concept DOG does not mean “dog or wolf”, it just means 
dog. 
 
Extensions can intuitively be thought of as sets of things that satisfy a property. The extension 
of, for example, the predicate “blue” is the set of all the things that are blue, i.e. all the 
particulars that instantiate the property blue. A theory of representation is required to account 
for the meaning/content of the symbols that represent. The concept DOG is about dogs, and 
only about dogs, the thought “that is a dog” is true if and only if the referent of “that” is a dog, 
etc. The disjunction problem threatens to make the concept DOG be about more than dogs, 
namely anything that is sufficient for tokening the concept, say wolves. This is not the right 
result for a theory of representation since it does not conform to the intuition we have been 
calling the intuition of the robustness of meaning. If it turns out that the informational theory 
is unable to attribute the correct extensions to concepts and other things that represent, then it 
must of course be rejected. 
 
This is clearly an unacceptable situation. For example, there are perhaps infinitely many 
properties that can be mistaken for a dog. This implies that DOG is concept with an open-
ended disjunctive extension, something that is clearly wrong. So, how can error and 
misrepresentation be accounted for? Before we turn to Dretske’s proposal and the 
historical/teleological theory’s proposal, let us see what these two proposals have in common: 
a distinction between what have been called type I and type II situations. 
 
3.2. Type I and Type II Situations   
The common strategy, though the actual proposals are very different, is this: It is to try to 
show that the situations where the predicate in question acquires a disjunctive extension are 
situations where the conditions for representation are not met (Fodor, 1990, p. 60). This 
amounts to introducing a further condition for representation than the ones we have 
considered so far. The new condition needs, like the ones we already have established, to be 
naturalistic in the same sense. The strategy is, in essence, to show that when misrepresentation 
occurs, something has ‘gone wrong’. In these situations, i.e., situations of misrepresentation, 
the conditions for representation are not met, and that explains why it is a misrepresentation, 
or an error. As we have said, we want the theory to account for what we have been calling, 
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following Fodor, the robustness of meaning. Robustness is the feature of meaning that we 
have taken to be the feature that enables a predicate to mean what it does and nothing else.  
 
The basic idea in having two types of situations in which representation can occur is that one 
can isolate the circumstances where the symbol only applies to what is in its extension. In the 
type I situation the sign both represents and means the property it expresses. Everything has 
gone right and the sign means what it should, i.e. it applies only to things in its extension. The 
type II situation is the type of situation where something goes wrong and the sign does not 
mean the property it expresses. This way of putting it is a consequence of what we have been 
calling the equation of “expressing a property” and “being sufficient for causing”. The 
disjunction problem is in a sense the problem of giving an answer to the question “when a 
symbol is caused by many different causes, which of these causes do the symbol express?”. 
By appealing to the type I/type II distinction one tries answer this question. For, in type I 
situations the symbol always expresses the property the symbol is caused by. In type II 
situations the sign is free to be caused by something other than the property it expresses. 
Dretske proposes that the type I situation should be understood as a learning situation. Let us 
see what this proposal amounts to.  
 
3.3. The Learning Situation 
Dretske is aware of the disjunction problem and has proposed a solution to it (Fodor, 1990, p. 
61). As we will see, his solution does not come without problems. Dretske’s solution involves 
a principled distinction between the meaning-bestowing, type I situation, and the regular 
situation with the possibility of misrepresentation, type II situation. The type I situation he 
identifies with what he calls the learning situation. The learning situation is the situation 
where the meaning of a term is learned, and in so doing the representation relation is fixed in 
a way that specifies the meaning of the term. 
 
According to Fodor there are reasons for thinking that Dretske’s proposal is not satisfactory 
(1990, p. 62-63). Suppose that a student has been taught what “dog” means by, we can 
assume, being exposed to dogs in a way that secures that the student makes the required 
connection between the dog and the symbol “dog”. This entails that during the whole of the 
training period the student has correctly applied the word “dog” to dogs, and only to dogs. 
Does this allow us to infer that what the student means by saying “dog” is not something 
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disjunctive? No. He might still mean something disjunctive by it because of the fact that the 
training period is finite, i.e. it is a period during which the student is only exposed to a finite 
number of things. Fodor expresses the problem like this:  
 
“[…] it’s the actual and counterfactual S-tokenings in training situations that fix the identity of the 
property that S expresses. Since it goes without saying that there must always be indefinitely many 
properties whose instantiations are not encountered in any finite linguistic apprenticeship, there are 
always indefinitely many disjunctive properties that the trainee’s use of “dog” could express, consonant 
with all of his actual tokenings of “dog” being dog-occasioned”. (Fodor, 1990, p. 62) 
 
The result is a dilemma which Fodor considers (1990, p. 62). The following is how I 
understand the dilemma. We have the actual S-tokenings under control in the learning 
situation, so S-tokens are by assumption only tokened of the right properties, i.e. properties 
that are in the extension of S. So we can safely assume that, “dog” -tokens are only applied to 
dogs by the student. The problem seems to be that we cannot be sure that the student actually 
means dog and only dog by his tokenings of “dog”. Fodor’s point is that the training situation, 
being finite, cannot in principle guarantee that the student never will apply the predicate of 
something else. Why is this so? Since the relationship between the symbol and the property 
expressed is a nomological one, it licenses the use of counterfactuals in the individuation of 
the property we take the symbol to be expressing. Counterfactuals and subjunctive 
conditionals are intuitively conditionals that say that if x were to be the case, then y would 
follow. We will not discuss the nature of counterfactuals other than observing that they are 
different from ordinary conditionals in that they can be true in relation to other worlds than 
the actual one. In this case we are interested in the truth of the conditional: ‘If the student 
encounters a cat-on-a-dark-night in the learning situation it will cause a “dog” token.’ This 
can be true of the student even if he never encounters a cat-on-a-dark-night. Since we are 
assuming that all of the student’s actual “dog” tokenings are dog-occasioned, we are assuming 
we are in the learning situation. In employing counterfactuals we will see that Dretske’s 
proposal entails a dilemma that has the consequence that his proposal does not solve the 
disjunction problem. Remember that a solution to the disjunction problem requires that one 
allows for a symbol to be false.  
 
Let us suppose that it is true that if a cat-on-a-dark-night had been encountered during the 
learning period it would have caused a “dog” tokening. That means that “dog” tokens express 
the property dog or cat-on-a-dark-night and the “dog” -tokens when caused by a cat-on-a-
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dark-night both in and out of the training situation are true. This is not the result we want, 
because it leaves no room for applications of “dog” to be false, i.e. to misrepresent dogs. 
 
What if we suppose that the aforementioned counterfactual is false, i.e. that the property cat-
on-a-dark-night would not cause “dog” tokens in the training situation? Then the consequence 
is that nothing other than dogs cause “dog” -tokens. After all, if cats-on-dark-nights could not 
have caused “dog” -tokens in the learning situation, there is no reason to suppose that they 
could have outside of the learning situation. This can be generalized such that nothing but 
dogs can cause “dog” –tokens, and all “dog” tokens are true. As we remember from above, 
this will not solve the problem. The problem is that on both alternatives “dog” tokens come 
out true. Symbol tokens are always true if they are applied to something in their extensions. 
When this extension is defined as what is sufficient for causing the symbol the result is that 
the symbol is always true of what causes it. This implies that they are never false, and thus 
cannot misrepresent. One can try to appeal to the counterfactuals concerning what the teacher 
would and would not have corrected, but that appeals to the intentions of the teacher, and is 
inadmissible in a naturalistic context. So, we can conclude that appealing to counterfactuals 
won’t help us in the learning situation case. This, I think, is a fatal objection to Dretske’s 
proposal. Let us turn to our other proposal: the teleological/historical theory’s proposal.  
 
3.4. The Teleological/Historical Theory’s Proposal 
Fodor’s argument against Dretske’s proposal shows that appealing to learning situations is 
unlikely to solve the problem, but it doesn’t show that the strategy of appealing to type I and 
type II situations cannot be made to work. What is needed is a situation that can establish the 
meaning of symbol, in such a way that allows for false tokens of the symbol, i.e. tokens that 
are caused by properties they don’t express. Fodor expresses what we are after nicely when he 
says:  
 
(i) If it’s a law that Ps cause S-tokens in type one situations, then S means P (and if P is disjunctive, 
then so be it); (ii) not all situations in which S gets tokened qualify as type one, so that tokens of S that 
happen in other sorts of situations are ipso facto free to be false. (Fodor, 1990, p. 64) 
 
We see from this formulation that the meaning-defining situation is the type I situation, where 
it is a causal law that does the work of attaching the symbol to the property. (It is worth noting 
that not all disjunctive concepts are bad. Some concepts have, after all, disjunctive 
extensions). The informational theory does not itself contain the condition for distinguishing 
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type I and type II situations. This condition must be stated independently of the informational 
theory.  
 
What kind of condition may plausibly be one that can serve as defining type I situations? As 
we observed above, the intuition we have concerning misrepresentation is that when 
something misrepresents, then something has gone wrong. Take, for example, our belief 
forming mechanisms. It is often supposed that when we have false beliefs there is an 
explanation as to how we have gotten this belief that includes a reference to something that 
went wrong in the belief forming process. The guiding intuition is the intuition that if the 
belief forming mechanism worked properly then the belief would be true. Right and wrong 
are, of course, normative notions, notions that are used to express how things should or 
shouldn’t happen. Situations of type II can be seen as the situations that allow for things that, 
in a sense, shouldn’t happen (where things go wrong). Can this normative aspect be exploited 
in defining a type I situation for representation?  
 
There are several things about this intuition of something having gone wrong in 
misrepresentation that I think is puzzling. Fodor quotes a passage of Stalnaker’s to illustrate 
his point:  
 
Where beliefs are false … we also expect some explanation for the deviation from the norm: either an 
abnormality in the environment, as in optical illusions or other kinds of misleading evidence, or an 
abnormality in the internal belief-forming mechanisms, as in wishful thinking or misremembering. 
(Stalnaker, quoted in Fodor, 1990, p. 64)  
 
Is it true that people typically excuse their false beliefs by saying something has gone wrong 
in their belief forming mechanisms? It is plausible, I think, that some perceptual beliefs are 
excusable in this manner, but people really do have false beliefs about many things that, at 
least not obviously, are a result of something going wrong. What, for example, has gone 
wrong in the belief-forming mechanisms of people who believe there are polar bears in 
Antarctica, or penguins at the North Pole? There are neither polar bears in Antarctica nor 
penguins at the North Pole, but what has gone wrong with those who believe it? It is not 
obvious that our brains are devices for making true beliefs with necessity when the condition 
that they are functioning as they should is satisfied. As with optical illusions, there is 
presumably nothing wrong with the belief-forming mechanisms of a person who believes the 
Müller-Lyer illusion is in fact a picture of two lines of differing lengths. This results in a false 
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belief with, in my opinion, nothing having gone wrong. I think this debate is very interesting 
but we will not pursue these questions in detail here. The historical/teleological theory 
assumes that the normative aspects of our biological natures can be exploited in constructing a 
substantial notion of a type I situation by defining a situation that is Normal. 
 
3.5.  Normal Conditions and Functions 
On the teleological/historical approach type I situations are called Normal situations (Fodor, 
1990, p. 64). “Normal” is a notion that is supposed to capture several things, first and 
foremost condition that in a Normal situation nothing can go wrong. When the normative 
notion of normality is intended it is usually signaled by a capital “N” (Fodor, 1990, p. 85). 
Fodor says: 
 
Normal … is a normative notion, and true is a normative notion, so maybe it’s not surprising if the 
former notion reconstructs the latter. … Of course, if the intentional circle is to be broken by appeal to 
Normal situations for symbol tokenings, we had better have some naturalistic story to tell about what it 
is for a situation to be Normal in the relevant respect. What might such a story look like? Roughly, the 
suggestion is that Normality should somehow be cashed by appeal to (natural) teleology; e.g., to some 
more-or-less Darwinian/historical notion of biological mechanisms doing what they were selected for. 
(Fodor, 1990, p. 64) 
 
Biological functions are functions that are typically individuated “Normally”. The Normal 
function of the heart is to pump blood around the body regardless of how many hearts in the 
world actually perform this function. In Normal contexts we can have a situation where only 
one heart fulfills its function while all the rest do not. In a normal (with no capital “n”) 
context this would not be true. Contexts that are normal in this way are often said to be 
statistical in the sense that it would not be normal to, say, go to the movies on a Saturday 
night if only one person does it. By contrast, it doesn’t matter for a Normal function how 
many of the individuals actually are performing the function. Normal is a normative notion, 
not a statistical notion (Fodor, 1990, p. 85). 
 
The concept of Normal conditions looks like they can provide us with the means we need to 
provide a substantial difference between type I and type II situations, something we saw 
Dretske’s proposal could not provide. Normal conditions look to be definable in biological 
terms and biology is a natural science. This, we may assume, will satisfy the naturalistic 
requirements. If what goes wrong can be specified with respect to some biological function 
that either functions inappropriately or functions in an environment that is inappropriate, it 
would seem we have a substantial notion between right and wrong, and thereby between type 
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I and type II situations. This is, in short, how the teleological/historical theory aims to account 
for error and misrepresentation. Let’s see how Fodor sketches how all of this happens: 
 
… an organism’s mental-state tokens get caused by, for example, events that transpire in the organism’s 
local environment. There are, of course, mechanisms – typically neuronal ones – that mediate these 
causal transactions. And these mechanisms have presumable got an evolutionary history. There are 
presumably the products of processes of selection, and it’s not implausible that what they were selected 
for is precisely their role in mediating the tokening of mental states. So there are these cognitive 
mechanisms, and there are these cognitive states; and the function of the former is to produce instances 
of the latter upon environmentally appropriate occasions. (Fodor, 1990, p. 65) 
 
We can say that we are talking about the World – Mind relation. In this case we are talking 
about the Environment – Cognitive State relation as a type of the World – Mind relation. This 
relation, we are assuming, is typically mediated by a mechanism. Intuitively this is our 
sensory equipment such as eyes and ears etc. and our various information processing systems 
in the brain. The end of this line is a cognitive state with content, i.e. a thought that is about 
the environmental state that caused it. The mediating mechanisms of this causal chain are 
what we will call the Cognitive Mechanisms, and it is with respect to these we are talking 
about functions. How does this help us with the type I/type II distinction?  
 
We said that misrepresentation happens when things go wrong. If the situation is Normal then 
things have gone as they should, and the representation relation between the Cognitive State 
and the Environment is in place. In a Normal situation things cannot go wrong. Things are 
Normal when the cognitive mechanisms are functioning as they should and the environment is 
such as the Cognitive Mechanism was “meant”, or “designed” to function in, i.e., the 
appropriate environment. There are several places in this schema where things might go 
wrong: (i) The Cognitive Mechanisms might malfunction and the Environment is right; (ii) 
The Cognitive Mechanisms are functioning correctly, but the Environment is wrong; (iii) 
Both the Cognitive Mechanisms are functioning incorrectly, and the Environment is wrong. If 
(i), (ii), or (iii) is true of a situation it is an abNormal situation, i.e. situation of type II, and the 
content of the Cognitive State is free to be false.   
 
This way of setting things up seems to constitute a substantive difference between type I and 
type II situations while satisfying the conditions for naturalism. If this is true it seems this 
account can solve the disjunction problem. Before we consider a case to which we apply this 
proposal let us first consider an example of what we take the notion of biological function to 
be. 
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The function of the cognitive mechanism and the environment are clearly intimately 
connected. Generally we can say that any biological function is closely connected to its 
environment. To take a common example, consider the heart. Let us suppose that the heart’s 
function is to produce some effect in the body, more specifically to create and sustain a 
certain type of pressure inside of the circulatory system, i.e. to pump the blood around the 
body. To individuate functions by the effects they produce is a common strategy. The classic 
example being a doorstop, where anything and everything capable of producing the effect of 
keeping a door open qualifies as being a doorstop. Biological functions are perhaps 
individuated by further criteria, but we are assuming that it is the same in principle. So, let’s 
suppose that the function of the heart is to create and sustain a certain pressure in the 
circulatory system. This is the heart’s Normal effect. The heart is dependent on several factors 
to perform this function. The two most important for us here is that the heart itself must 
perform what it in and of itself must do, i.e. to contract in some sort of sequence, and, the 
environment in which the heart finds itself must be such as to connect the heart’s movements 
with the effect of creating and sustaining a certain type of pressure. That environment most 
typically is a body. The heart can stop functioning if the heart itself is not working right, or 
the heart can function but in a body that does not sustain an appropriate environment. The 
functioning of the heart is a good example of a biological function. We are supposing in what 
follows that the cognitive mechanisms are biological mechanisms in the same way as the 
heart. If this is right we can say that for type I situations, i.e. Normal situations, both what we 
have been calling the cognitive mechanism and the environment must work, and be of the 
proper type for each other. Let us now consider the example of the fly and the frog. 
  
3.6.  The Fly and the Frog 
There is a well known thought experiment often used to illustrate and argue for different 
views in this debate, and that is the example of the fly and the frog (Fodor, 1990, p. 70-71). It 
is an example used both by the advocates of teleological solution to the disjunction problem, 
and the ones who think that teleology will not solve the problem. As we will see, the problem 
with the teleological solution, according to Fodor, is that it doesn’t manage to account for 
what we earlier called the “fine-grainedness” of meaning, a problem which can be traced to 
the problem of giving naturalistic conditions that will reconstruct systems that individuate 
content as finely as belief – and other intentional contexts. It is in many ways a similar 
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problem to the Frege cases we considered in chapter 2. But before we go into all of this let us 
see how Fodor formulates the account he wants to criticize. This is his reconstruction of what 
a historical/teleological answer to the question of meaning is: 
 
[I]f you say to an informational semantical  [sic] “Please, how does meaning work?” you are likely to 
get a song and dance about what happens when frogs stick their tongues out at flies. “There is,” so the 
song goes, “a state S of the frog’s nervous system such that: (i) S is reliably caused by flies in Normal 
circumstances; (ii) S is the Normal cause of an ecologically appropriate, fly directed response; (iii) 
Evolution bestowed S on frogs because (i) and (ii) are true of it.” S, one might say, Normally resonates 
to flies. And it is only because it Normally does so that Mother Nature has bestowed it on the frog. And 
it is only because Mother Nature has bestowed it on the frog only because it Normally resonates to flies 
that tokens of this state mean fly even in those (abNormal) circumstances in which it is not flies but 
something else that to which the S-tokens are resonating. (Fodor, 1990, p. 70) 
 
When considering this paragraph it is important to bear in mind that on the 
historical/teleological view, the state S of the frog’s nervous system is functionally 
individuated. Fodor has several arguments against this view, the most important of which is 
this: The functional individuation of the neurological state that (i) and (ii) is true of is 
supposed to be sufficient for the individuation of the semantic content of the state. This, in 
turn, means not only that having beliefs has a Normal function, but also having particular 
beliefs has a Normal function. Fodor considers an example of Millikan’s where the proper 
(Normal) function of the desire to “win the local Democratic nomination for first selectman is 
to bring it about that one wins the local Democratic nomination for first selectman” (Fodor, 
1990, p. 67). It is by appealing to the function of the intentional state that one individuates the 
content of the intentional state. Fodor argues against this view, very persuasively, I think 
(Fodor, 1990, p. 67). For example, Fodor says:  
 
Stevenson wanted to win just as much as Eisenhower did, and the circumstances were equally Normal 
for both. But Eisenhower won and Stevenson didn’t. In Normal circumstances, not more than one of 
them could have, what with elections being zero-sum games. So how could it be that, in virtue of a law 
or other reliable mechanism, in Normal circumstances everybody wins whatever elections he wants to. 
When the situation is Normal, the lion wants to eat and the lamb wants not to be eaten. But. … (Fodor, 
1990, p. 67-68). 
 
Millikan, as we have seen, proposes that intentional states can be individuated by reference to 
their proper functions (Fodor, 1990, p. 67). Fodor argues against this. However, it is important 
to note that Fodor’s main argument against the teleological solution to the disjunction 
problem does not depend on assuming that the functions of the intentional states determine 
their content. What, on the historical/teleological theory, determines content is the Normal 
function of the cognitive mechanism which realizes the intentional state. Now that we have 
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observed this let us see what the historical/teleological proposal amounts to in the example 
with the frog and the fly.  
 
There is a mechanism that mediates the relation between the state S in the frogs mind and the 
environment the frog is in. Let us suppose the environment is Normal. The state S is about 
flies, i.e. means fly, because it is reliably occasioned by flies. We suppose this because when 
the flies are in the right relation to the frog, the frog will try, and often succeed, to eat the fly. 
This, we know, is good for the frog, because it helps the frog to survive. And the reason the 
mechanism is as it is, we can suppose, is because the mechanism is chosen by evolution to 
perform just this mediating task between flies and S because the ingestion of flies is good for 
the frog.  
 
We can determine the content of the state because we know what the function of the 
mechanism is. This we have determined because we know what, evolutionary speaking, is 
good for the frog. Eating flies is Normally good, so the fly eating mechanism is functioning 
Normally when it mediates the relation between flies, S and the subsequent eating of the flies. 
We can individuate the content of the state S because that is consequent upon individuating 
the function of the mediating mechanism. What makes this inference from the function of the 
mechanism to the content of the state possible is the historical/teleological theory’s 
assumption that the function of the mechanism determines the content of the intentional state. 
So, the problem of determining content becomes, on the historical/teleological account, the 
problem of determining function. 
 
But does this show us that the function of the mechanism is to make the frog catch flies? 
Fodor argues that it does not (1990, p. 72). The problem is that what happens in this example 
is that one either assumes the content of the state, and infers the function of the mechanism; or 
one assumes what the mechanism is designed to do, and infers the content of the state it 
produces. If one assumes that the function of the mechanism is to get the frog to eat flies it 
reasonably follows that the intentional state is about flies. And we know from biology that it 
is the function of the mechanism to make the frog eat flies. So, what is the problem? 
 
For Fodor (1990, p. 72), the problem is that these types of accounts do not take into account 
the fact that we are in fact describing phenomena. We forget that this is only one description 
we could give, and if we lose sight of the fact that we are on a descriptive level we may 
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conclude that we have determined the content of S when we have not. This is illustrated by 
the fact that we can tell this story in other terms. Let us assume that in the frog’s Normal 
environment all the flies are, say, little black dots. It is, I think, plausible that if you throw 
something that has the appearance of a little black dot in front of a frog, the frog will snap at 
it. If this is right, and the function of the mechanism is that of mediating little black dot 
sightings to the snap guiding mechanism, then we can conclude that the content of S can 
equally well be taken to be little black dot. This is not the desired result for the 
historical/teleological approach. Fodor says: 
 
Notice that, just as there is a teleological explanation of why frogs should have fly detectors – assuming 
that that is the right intentional description of what they have – so too there is a teleological explanation 
of why frogs should have little-ambient-black-thing detectors – assuming that that is the right 
intentional description of what they have. The explanation is that in the environment in which the 
mechanism Normally operates all (or, most, or anyhow enough) of the little ambient black dots are flies. 
So, in this environment, what ambient-black-dot detectors Normally detect (de re, as it were) is just 
what fly detectors Normally detect (de dicto, as it were); wiz., flies. (Fodor, 1990, p. 72) 
 
A condition on the teleological theory is that the function of the mechanism should be the 
reason why evolution has bestowed it upon the frog. The selectional advantages that come 
with the function of the mechanism are the reason why the organism has the mechanism. So, 
what selectional advantage is the mechanism in question responsible for producing? We can 
assume that the answer is the ingestion of flies, because that is the prime source of food for 
the frog. The flies are part of the frog’s Normal environment and the ingestion of food 
produces obvious selectional advantages.  
 
This means that the condition on the theory requires that the function should produce the right 
effect: ingesting flies. Fodor says: “Darwin cares how many flies you eat, but not what 
description you eat them under” (1990, p. 73). The conclusion is that the 
historical/teleological theory does not manage to provide a univocal description of the 
function in question. This is critical for its ability to ascribe content to the intentional states of 
the frog. When the theory assumes that the content of the mental state is determined by the 
function of the mechanism that produces it, the content of the mental state is obviously 
sensitive to the function of the mediating mechanism. When the function of the mechanism is 
indeterminate the consequence is that the content of the mental state is also indeterminate. 
Mechanisms that detect black dots are equally effective in helping the frog survive as 
mechanisms that detect flies in environments where all the black dots are flies. We can 
conclude from this that the indeterminacy of functional ascriptions results in indeterminacy of 
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content ascriptions and thus that the historical/teleological theory does not solve the 
disjunction problem.      
 
I think this line of argument is persuasive and that it shows that the teleological theory cannot 
distinguish between the hypothesis that the content of the mental state S is fly or the 
hypothesis that it is ambient-black-dot. The reason the argument works is that the 
historical/teleological theory does not have available a common way of individuating 
functions, namely by using counterfactuals. The reason this is unavailable is that the 
historical/teleological theory wants to cash functions out in terms of selectional advantages. 
For a Darwinian something can only be a selectional advantage if it is an actual advantage. On 
the Darwinian picture, a mechanism cannot be selected for the advantages it would have 
generated if the environment had been different. The mechanisms of selection are such that 
only actual advantages result in the survival of the actual individuals who have it. Fodor has 
an example of a fish that lives deep in the ocean where there is no light (1990, p. 76). This 
fish has a certain color. Fodor claims, rightly I think, that the reason that fish has that color, 
the advantages the fish has in virtue of having that color cannot be attributed to the 
counterfactual situation that if the fish had lived in a part of the ocean with much more light, 
say, at the surface, then it would have had an advantage. Organisms cannot, evolutionary 
speaking, have properties that are accounted for by reference to the selectional advantages the 
properties would have imbued in circumstances other than what the organism actually lives 
in.  
 
3.7. Counterfactuals and Functions 
As we have seen, the option of appealing to counterfactuals in determining function is out of 
the question for the historical/teleological theory. But why are counterfactuals a good option? 
What is it about counterfactuals that can solve the disjunction problem? The answer is that 
counterfactuals can split co-extensional terms (perhaps not all, but presumably enough). Let’s 
see what Fodor says: 
 
Let’s ask how much intentional indeterminacy one would have to put up with on the teleological story. I 
think that the right answer is that appeals to mechanism of selection won’t decide between reliably 
equivalent content ascriptions; i.e., they won’t decide between any pair of equivalent content ascriptions 
where the equivalence is counterfactual supporting. To put this in the formal mode, the context: was 
selected for representing things as F is transparent to the substitution of predicates reliably coextensive 
with F. A fortiori, it is transparent to the substitution of predicates necessarily (including nomologically 
necessarily) coextensive with F. In consequence, evolutionary theory offers us no contexts that are as 
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intentional as ‘believes that. …’ If this is right, then it’s a conclusive reason to doubt that appeals to 
evolutionary teleology can reconstruct the intentionality of mental states. (Fodor, 1990, p. 73) 
 
Belief contexts, which are perhaps the paradigm of intentional contexts, are what one usually 
calls opaque contexts. This is a trademark feature of the mental, or of what we saw Dretske 
calling “genuine cognitive systems”, earlier. As a type of the Frege cases this is a recurring 
problem for the informational theory. As we have seen, the informational theory has severe 
problems accounting for how predicates like, say, “triangular” and “trilateral”, can come 
apart. We saw in the case with the fly and the frog that the informational theory can only 
distinguish between predicates that have different extensions. And it seems no extensional 
context can split properties like triangularity and trilaterality.  
 
This is a challenge for all types of naturalistic semantics: to show that there can be contents 
that are as fine grained as those needed for making propositional attitude ascriptions. The 
conditions for meaning/content that the teleological/historical theory postulates are in this 
regard not sufficient. They cannot distinguish between contents that are reliably co-extensive 
because the way the teleological/historical theory individuates content is by appealing to the 
function of the state that produces the content. The problem with this, as we have seen, is that 
individuating functions by way of appealing to selectional mechanisms does not yield 
univocal functional ascriptions. If the function cannot be determined the content cannot be 
determined either. The reason for this is that selectional mechanism does not carve the world 
finer than extensions. In environments where all little black dots are flies and all flies are little 
black dots all the individuals that satisfy the one predicate will satisfy the other.    
 
If one can appeal to counterfactuals, things change. One can imagine a world in which none 
of the little black dots are flies and flies are instead little bright dots, say. If we imagine taking 
some of our frogs from this world to the world just described, we can assume, we would find 
that the frogs snap at the little black dots but not the little bright dots, i.e. the flies. Then we 
can conclude that the content of the state of the frog is little-black-dot, and not fly. This move, 
though attractive, is not available for the teleological/historical theorist for the reasons we 
considered above.  
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3.8. Conclusion  
This concludes the first part of this thesis. We started by considering naturalistic theories in 
general and what is required of them. The informational theory was found to be the most 
plausible one. This first part has mainly been concerned with the question of naturalization, 
and partly with the questions concerning meaning. We have seen that the informational theory 
can serve as a base for a theory of representation, but that it has severe problems. We have 
focused on the disjunction problem and several proposals for how to solve it. We have seen 
that both of them are inadequate.  
 
Of the three main intuitions we mentioned on the outset this part has only been concerned 
with two of them: naturalization and robustness. In the next part, when we consider Fodor’s 
own proposal for solving the disjunction problem, we will focus more on the issue of 
robustness and less on the issue of naturalization. We have seen that much of the 
naturalization problem is solved by having the informational theory as a base. We will also 
address the third intuition, the intuition that meaning is not everywhere, in the next part. I will 
argue that Fodor does not sufficiently establish that his theory conforms to this intuition. 
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Part II: 
 
4. Chapter IV: Asymmetric Dependence 
 
Let us start this part by summing up what we have concluded so far. We have seen that 
teleological/historical solutions to the disjunction problem fail. To solve the disjunction 
problem the theory is required provide unique content ascriptions to a mental state without 
employing semantic/intentional terms. The historical/teleological theory’s proposal manages 
to not use semantic/intentional terms, but the mechanism by which the content is to be 
individuated is, as we saw in the previous chapter, dependent on univocal ascriptions of 
function to the cognitive mechanism responsible for producing the mental state.  
 
The problem of individuating content thus becomes the problem of individuating function. 
We saw that the historical/teleological theory can only appeal to actual selectional advantages 
in doing this. A crucial consequence of this is that the historical/teleological approach 
excludes appeals to counterfactuals in determining function. It follows that the 
teleological/historical theory cannot distinguish between reliably co-extensional descriptions 
in specifying function. This is because functions are individuated by the effects they produce, 
and teleological/historical theories cannot distinguish between effects that are equally good at 
producing the right selectional results. Consequently, any description of a function that makes 
the organism that possesses it fit with the selectional constraints, specifically that the 
organism survives, is a reasonable description of the function.  
 
We remember this from the example with the frog and the fly. Teleological/historical theories 
could not distinguish between descriptions of the relevant mechanism that had the effect that 
the frog ingested flies. We have assumed that the purpose of the mechanism is to enable the 
frog to catch flies. But as we saw the frog eats just as many flies when we describe the 
function of the mechanism as making the frog ingest little black dots. That is because little 
black dots are reliably flies in the world the frog is in. On the historical/teleological account 
function determines content, so where the function of a mechanism is indeterminate it follows 
that the content of the state is also indeterminate. In these cases we are unable to distinguish 
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between content ascriptions where the contents are reliably co-extensive in the frog’s 
environment.  
 
What, then, is the content if the frog’s mental state? We know that different things are true of 
flies and little black dots, and we do not treat them the same. The question is if they are 
different for the frog. Do the frogs treat them differently? There are reasons to suppose that 
they don’t. Frogs will snap at things that look like flies (i.e. that look like little black dots), 
that are not flies. In the context of informational semantics where the information relation is 
that of a reliable co-variation between cause and effect, we say that the effect carries 
information about what causes it. The effect in question is the frog’s snapping. The cause is 
whatever is sufficient for causing the frog to snap, and it seems that flies are only a subset of 
everything that elicits snaps from the frog. Since there are other things that elicit snaps, flies 
cannot be the cause of the snaps qua flies. They must be the causes of snaps qua something 
else, i.e. little black dots. Counterfactuals can, in this way, determine the content of the frog’s 
mental state. But is this enough to solve the disjunction problem generally? 
  
Informational semantics’ proposal is that the content of a mental state expresses whatever 
property is responsible for causing it. “Horse” means horse because horses reliably cause 
“horse”. This, as we saw earlier, generates disjunctions problems, specifically about error. 
The teleological/historical solution to this problem is to distinguish between two types of 
situations: Normal and abNormal situations where the situation that guaranties that what 
causes the predicate (the content of the state) is what is in the extension of the predicate. This 
secures that the predicate is caused only by what it applies to, or is about. The teleologically 
Normal situation for the frog is when the frog gets to ingest flies. We saw that the 
historical/teleological theory’s resources for specifying the content of a mental state are spent 
by specifying the function of the mechanism that produces the state. I think that Fodor’s 
argument shows that the strategy of the historical/teleological theory does not provide the 
right result. The right result would be specifying a unique content to the frog’s mental state, 
and the historical/teleological theory fails to provide such unique ascription of content 
because it fails to uniquely specify the function of the mechanism which is responsible for 
producing the mental state. This we established in the previous chapter. The main theme for 
this chapter is to formulate Fodor’s own proposed solution to the disjunction problem. The 
key intuition about meaning to be accounted for by his proposal is the one we have been 
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calling the robustness of meaning. As we will see, accounting for this intuition and solving the 
disjunction problem are the “same undertaking” (Fodor, 1990, p.91).  
  
4.1.  Robustness and Extensions 
As an alternative to appealing to different types of situations, Fodor introduces what he calls 
the asymmetric dependency condition (1990, p. 90). This is his proposal for accounting for 
the robustness of meaning. Robustness, as we have seen, is one of the pre-theoretic intuitions 
about meaning that any meaning theory must account for. Meaning is something that is 
intuitively inherently robust. Fodor expresses what he takes robustness to be like this: 
 
In actual fact, “cow” tokens get caused in all sorts of ways, and they all mean cow for all of that. 
Solving the disjunction problem and making clear how a symbol’s meaning could be so insensitive to 
variability in the causes of its tokenings are really two ways of describing the same undertaking. If 
there’s going to be a causal theory of content, there has to be some way of picking out semantically 
relevant causal relations from all other kinds of causal relations that the tokens of a symbol can enter 
into. And we’d better not do this by implicitly denying robustness – e.g., by idealizing to contexts of 
etiological homogeneity. (Fodor, 1990, p. 91) 
 
The most intuitive, and obvious example of the robustness of meaning is a case we have not 
yet considered. It is, perhaps, clearest counter-example to informational semantics in the form 
we have been considering. The example has to do with how thoughts relate to, on the one 
hand, what causes them, and on the other, what they are about. The feature of thoughts we are 
after here is one that, prima facie, seems to be at odds with the basic assumptions of 
informational semantics. The informational theory claims that the reason a predicate means 
what it does is because it expresses the property which is causally responsible for its 
occurrence. When we think of examples concerning perception this intuitively seems 
reasonable because it is intuitive that when we see a horse and think “there’s a horse”, it is the 
horse that is causally responsible for our thinking that particular thought. But what about 
cases where there are no horses and one is merely thinking about old western movies, and 
suddenly one finds oneself thinking about horses? These horse-thoughts are not occasioned by 
horses at all. They are perhaps occasioned by cowboy-thoughts, but this is of course not a 
requirement for being a horse-thought.  
 
The crucial point is that we constantly think thoughts that aren’t caused by what they are 
about. They are most often caused by other thoughts. Horse-thoughts can be occasioned by 
almost anything, but horse-thoughts mean horse regardless of what causes them. Fodor says: 
“… the meaning of a symbol is one of the things that all of its tokens have in common, 
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however they happen to be caused” (1990, p. 90). And, this seems to be the case the other 
way as well, namely that horses are not always sufficient for someone to think “horse”. This 
is the other side of the error story we have been telling. When you mistake something for 
something else, say a horse for a cow, and “horse” is a misrepresentation of cow, then cow is 
not sufficient for the tokening of “cow”. So, robustness is the intuition that the meaning of a 
predicate is distinct from what causes its tokening. Robustness is an absolute demand on this 
kind of theory, and as we have described it here, if you have a meaning theory that doesn’t 
make meaning robust it will not qualify as a meaning theory.     
  
As we will see, Fodor’s solution to the problem of robustness is twofold. First, we can 
observe that the problem is not a problem about the informational approach. Rather, it is a 
problem about having to rely on a distinction between type I, and type II –situations. The 
problem, Fodor thinks, is caused by appealing to special type of situation which is such that in 
that situation a symbol cannot be caused by anything that is not in the symbols extension. 
This is equivalent to saying that there is a situation where a sign is always true about what 
causes it. In such a situation a symbol, say “dog”, if it is caused at all, is necessarily caused by 
dogs and nothing else. It is this feature of the informational approach, a strategy we saw that 
both Dretske and the historical/teleological approach tried to use in solving the disjunction 
problem that Fodor dispenses with. He does not dispense with the basic framework of the 
informational theory. 
  
Second, he introduces his asymmetric dependency theory to account for robustness. How is 
this criterion to account for robustness? The asymmetric dependence condition should provide 
a criterion for distinguishing the tokenings of predicates that are caused by something in the 
predicate’s extension and those that are not. It is important to distinguish between two ways 
we can talk about extensions on the naturalistic view. The first way is a term for what a 
predicate applies to. This is the normal sense of the term. The term “dog” has dogs and only 
dogs in its extension because dogs are what the term applies to. In this sense “the meaning of 
a term” and “the extension of a term” is roughly equivalent. The second way is a way of 
determining the meaning of a term in an informational theory by specifying a term’s sufficient 
causes. The goal is, by employing only non-intentional/non-semantic terms, to reconstruct a 
symbol’s extension by specifying the symbol’s sufficient causes. This is, as I see it, the core 
of the disjunction problem. What we called the first view of extension is roughly equivalent to 
the meaning of the term. The term “dog” has dogs and only dogs in its extension because it 
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means dog. One can solve the disjunction problem by naturalistically specifying extensions 
that capture this feature of meaning. The disjunction problem is that informational theories 
ascribe disjunctive extensions to terms that intuitively don’t have disjunctive extensions; this, 
of course, is a problem because the terms don’t mean something disjunctive. The solution to 
the disjunction problem requires the theory to ascribe correct extensions to terms like “dog”.    
 
4.2. Asymmetric Dependence  
As we have seen, Fodor’s solution to the disjunction problem relies on finding an alternative 
to relying on the distinction between the type I and type II –situation. His proposal is to 
appeal to dependences among the causal generalizations that govern symbol tokenings, in 
hope of determining which causal generalization is the one that is semantically relevant. But 
before we get to that, let us see what asymmetric dependence is. Intuitively, asymmetric 
dependence is a dependence relation where the dependence does not go both ways. Let us 
suppose A is asymmetrically dependent on B.  This means that if you have A then you have 
B, but not necessarily the other way around, i.e. it means that you can have B without having 
A. I suppose having a bike and riding a bike exemplify such a relation. You can have a bike 
without riding it, but you cannot ride the bike without having it. There is obviously no bike 
riding to be done where there are no bikes. But there can be bikes where there is no bike 
riding. So intuitively, riding bikes is asymmetrically dependent on having bikes. One common 
way of talking about asymmetric dependence is to talk about it in terms of possible worlds. 
On this reading we shall say that A is asymmetrically dependent on B if the worlds in which 
B is the case and A isn’t, are closer to us than the world where A is and B isn’t. This is 
obviously a very general condition that very many pairs of things will satisfy. This definition 
is intended to exemplify how asymmetric dependencies are defined in terms of possible 
worlds. It is possible to operate with a more narrow scope, as Fodor does when he restricts the 
relevant dependencies to being dependencies among laws.  
 
To conclude the example we can say that worlds where there are bikes but no bike riding are 
closer to us than worlds where there are bike riding but no bikes. This latter world is arguably 
an impossible one, but that is only to say that bikes are necessary for bike riding. There is 
some controversy about how to determine distance between possible worlds, something we 
will get back to when we discuss Paul Boghossian’s objections in chapter 6. The idea is that 
all the false tokens of a symbol depend on there being a true token of a symbol, and that this 
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relation can be exploited in solving the disjunction problem. We now have a basic grasp of 
what asymmetric dependence is. Now, let us see how Fodor thinks that this condition can be 
used to solve the disjunction problem without having to face the same problems that Dretske 
and the historical/teleological approach did. 
  
This is what Fodor says, when he advances the idea of asymmetrical dependence as a 
preferable alternative to “idealizing to contexts of etiological homogeneity” (1990, p. 91) –i.e. 
postulating type I situations:  
 
Here’s a first approximation to the proposal that I favor: Cows cause “cow” tokens, and (let’s suppose) 
cats cause “cow” tokens. But “cow” means cow and not cat or cow or cat because there being cat-
caused “cow” tokens depends on there being cow-caused “cow” tokens, but not the other way around. 
“Cow” means cow because, as I shall henceforth put it, noncow-caused “cow” tokens are 
asymmetrically dependent upon cow-caused “cow” tokens. “Cow” means cow because but that “cow” 
tokens carry information about cows, they wouldn’t carry information about anything. (Fodor, 1990, p. 
91) 
 
We remember from above that the first part of Fodor’s theory is to assume the framework of 
the informational theory. We also remember that this takes the form of reliable causal 
conditionals that are counterfactual supporting and can therefore be regarded as laws (ceteris 
paribus). We are assuming that when a cow causes a “cow” token it does so in virtue of 
having the property cow, which is a causal property that has the causal power to produce 
“cow” tokens. As we mentioned before, there are indefinitely many properties that has the 
power to cause “cow” tokens. Every one of those properties can be subsumed by a causal 
generalization, i.e. a law with the property, X, on the antecedent side, and symbol “cow” on 
the consequent side. This is a consequence of the holistic character of belief fixation 
(Boghossian, 1991, p. 78), something we will review later. Fodor’s proposal is thus that the 
disjunction problem is no longer the problem of determining what situation is the meaning 
bestowing one, but rather which, of the indeterminately many laws is the meaning 
determining one. This constitutes a radical break from the approaches we have considered so 
far, i.e. Dretske’s proposal and the historical/teleological theory’s proposal. 
  
Fodor’s proposal is, in effect, to see which laws are dependent on each other. The main idea is 
that if he can find one predicate governing law that all the other laws asymmetrically depend 
on then he has found the law that determines the meaning of the predicate. This is achieved if 
he can determine the law that, if broken breaks all the rest, i.e. makes the predicate not caused 
at all. We saw this in the example with the bike. If we take away the bike, the consequence is 
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that there is no bike riding to be done. If one removes the bike riding, one can still have a bike 
and we can conclude that riding bikes is asymmetrically dependent on having bikes. But the 
bike example does not exemplify what asymmetric dependence amounts to in the context of 
semantics. First of all, bike riding doesn’t mean bike in any meaningful sense of the word and 
neither is bike riding any kind of causal consequence of bikes.  
 
In the next chapter, chapter 5, we will see how Fodor, by employing the asymmetric 
dependency condition, aims to account for the robustness of meaning. The rest of this chapter 
is devoted to considering how Fodor aims to account for the other main intuition about 
meaning mentioned in the introduction of the thesis, namely the intuition that meaning is not 
everywhere, or ubiquitous as Fodor sometimes puts it (1990, p. 93). The way of accounting 
for this intuition is to show that the theory does not entail what is known as pan-semanticism, 
which just is the implication that meaning is everywhere. We will consider Fodor’s account of 
pan-semanticism, and I will argue that there are reasons for thinking that it is not satisfactory. 
I will not try to show that Fodor’s view implies pan-semanticism, only that he does not show 
that pan-semanticism does not follow from his views.    
 
4.3.  Pan-Semanticism 
There are, as we have observed, two important intuitions which a theory of meaning needs to 
account for, both of which, if not accounted for, implies that the theory is not successful as a 
theory of meaning. The robustness of meaning is one of them. A theory of meaning which 
doesn’t make meaning robust is not satisfactory as a meaning theory. The other important 
intuition is that not everything has meaning. Pre-theoretically we think that there are only a 
few things that have meaning. Words, sentences and thoughts are common examples. A 
theory of meaning that has the implication that everything has meaning is not only 
unsatisfactory as a theory of meaning, the implication amounts to a reductio of the theory. The 
failure to account for one or both of the main intuitions amounts to a reductio of the theory.   
 
In this section I want to argue that Fodor does not convincingly argue that his theory does not 
imply pan-semanticism. The reason for this is that he does not account for his assumption that 
only symbols are candidates for having meaning. Pan-semanticism is a big worry for all 
information based accounts of meaning since information is, just as meaning is not, 
everywhere. Since information is everywhere there is causality and meaning is constructed 
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from information the theory threatens to imply that meaning is everywhere as well. This 
would be a catastrophic result for a meaning theory. Fodor argues that his theory does not 
have this consequence (1990, p. 92). I argue that his argument does not succeed in 
establishing this conclusion. 
  
Fodor observes (1990, p. 93) that pan-semanticism is sensitive to the fact that the information 
relation is transitive. If A  B and B  C then C carries information about A. Fodor uses the 
example with smoke and fire. If we take “smoke” to mean smoke and smoke means fire, then 
presumably “smoke” means fire. But, “smoke” doesn’t mean fire, and consequently the theory 
has yielded the wrong result and implies pan-semanticism. How is this problem to be solved? 
Fodor’s solution is to appeal to asymmetric dependence to decide between the laws ‘smoke  
“smoke”’, and ‘fire  “smoke”’. If we do this we see that “smoke” does not mean fire 
because the law ‘fire  “smoke”’ is asymmetrically dependent on the ‘smoke  “smoke”’ 
law. This means that the worlds where smoke causes “smoke” tokens without fire causing 
“smoke” tokens are closer than the worlds where fire causes “smoke” tokens and smoke 
doesn’t.  
  
Fodor frames this by specifying which information relations depend on which. In his version 
of this argument (1990, p. 93) there are not only two such information relations, but three. 
The ‘smoke  “smoke”’ relation, ‘the fire  “smoke”’ relation and the ‘fire  smoke’ 
relation. Let’s see what he says. 
 
“Smoke” tokens carry information about fire (when they’re caused by smoke that’s caused by fire). But 
they don’t mean fire because their dependence on fire is asymmetrically dependent on their dependence 
on smoke. Break the fire  smoke connection, and the smoke  “smoke” connection remains intact; our 
using “smoke” in situations where there’s fire doesn’t depend on smoke’s carrying information about 
fire. But break the smoke  “smoke” connection and the fire  “smoke” connection goes too; our 
using “smoke” in situations where there’s fire does depend on “smoke”’s carrying information about 
smoke. (Fodor, 1990, p. 93) 
 
This argument, as far as I can see, establishes that “smoke” does not mean fire. However, I 
will argue that this does not establish that Fodor’s position does not imply pan-semanticism. 
As this argument stands it is assumed that only signs of a particular kind can carry 
information in the way that can be the basis for meaning. I think that there are two ways of 
reading this quote, two ways that the argument can be interpreted. I’m inclined to read the 
‘fire  smoke’ connection, i.e. where there are no inverted commas around smoke as in the 
rest of the quote, as a typographical error and that the inverted commas were intended to be 
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there. This is what I will be calling the non-literal way of reading the quote. The literal way of 
reading the quote is to read it as it is written. The inverted commas are, of course, what 
signals that the word within is a symbol that stands for something. But the assumption that 
there are only symbols of this kind that can enter into meaning relations is an assumption that 
is in need of an argument. This is something Fodor does not provide. That certain kinds of 
things, namely symbols, are the only things that can stand in meaning-relations with other 
things is what the argument is supposed to show, not what it is supposed to assume. The 
worry that needs to be dispelled if Fodor is to establish that pan-semanticism does not follow 
from his theory is not the worry that “smoke” means fire. What he needs to show is that 
smoke doesn’t mean fire. 
 
The asymmetric dependence condition is supposed to determine the content of a symbol. It 
does so by distinguishing between all the different laws that describe the causing of the 
symbol, and, by determining which of the laws all the others depend upon but which itself 
does not depend upon any other. The point I want to make here is that it is assumed that all 
the laws we are talking about are laws that are symbol causing laws, i.e. that they have a 
predicate X that is framed by inverted commas as the consequence. This means that all that 
the asymmetric dependence condition applies to are symbol causing laws, or, equivalently, 
laws that govern the tokenings of symbols. But to establish that the theory doesn’t imply pan-
semanticism Fodor simply cannot assume this. Pan-semanticism is a terrible implication of a 
theory for many reasons, but chiefly this: that smoke, qua standing in a reliable co-variance 
with fire, comes out as meaning fire, is nonsensical, and unbelievable. An absurd consequence 
of pan-semanticism and the disjunction problem may perhaps also be that smoke does, in a 
sense, mean not only fire, but also smoke-machine in a way that makes smoke disjunctive. 
This way of saying it makes clear the absurdity of the result that smoke, in and of itself, has a 
meaning. What would it be for smoke to, for example, have an extension, be it disjunctive or 
otherwise?  
 
Let us see what happens if we try to use Fodor’s theory’s resources and construct an argument 
that shows that pan-semanticism doesn’t follow from his theory. We will consider how Fodor 
treats the cases of inter-level relations and causal chains in a Theory of Content (1990). 
Especially the causal chain case, I argue, has similarities with the pan-semanticism case that 
we can exploit in constructing the argument. It is important to note that this argument assumes 
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that one cannot independently account for a substantive notion of symbol which dissolves the 
pan-semanticism worry. I assume that Fodor has not presented such an account.  
  
This problem arises from the informational theory’s reconstruction of “means that” from 
“carries information about” (Fodor, 1990, p. 92). As Fodor puts it: “Information is ubiquitous 
but not robust; meaning is robust but not ubiquitous.” (1990, p. 93). Fodor’s solution is a 
solution to the disjunction problem for the symbol “smoke” when it is indeterminate if the 
symbol means fire or smoke because of the transitive nature of the information relation. It is 
not necessarily a solution to why smoke, in and of itself (whatever that may mean), does not 
mean fire. After all, smoke stands in an information-bearing relationship with fire much in the 
same way as mercury stands in an information-bearing relation to the surrounding ambient 
temperature, as we saw in the example with the thermometer. To solve the problem in the way 
that Fodor does is, in effect, to say that only a certain kind of information bearing relations 
qualify as symbol relations, and for those the problem of pan-semanticism never arises. I 
argue that what is doing all the work in this argument is a substantive notion of symbol-hood 
which is not accounted for, only assumed.  
 
The reason asymmetric dependence can be thought not to be able to solve this problem is the 
fact that the only available dependencies it can distinguish between are the ones with the same 
consequent. That is, they can only distinguish between fire caused “smoke” tokens and smoke 
caused “smoke” tokens. In both causes the relevant laws have “smoke” as the consequent. 
These laws cannot, in the relevant sense, be dependent on laws that have different 
consequents. After all, the problem the asymmetric dependence relation is intended to solve 
seems to be how one and the same sign seem to have more than one meaning, not how several 
different signs have several different meanings. Therefore it doesn’t seem that the relevant 
dependencies can include the fire causing smoke law. So what motivates Fodor’s appeal to the 
asymmetric dependence relation in this case, when it is clear that the pan-semanticism 
implication cannot be dealt with by the asymmetric dependence relation, understood as a 
relation among laws with the same consequents? Let’s see what Fodor says about some 
similar cases, namely the cases about inter level relations and causal chains. 
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4.4. Inter-Level Relations and Causal Chains 
The result Fodor needs in these cases is to show that none of them exhibit robustness. Since 
they are, as we will see, cases of asymmetric dependence it is crucial that they are of the 
wrong type to produce robustness. Cases where there are mechanisms that implement macro 
laws are typical cases of this kind. This is a typical feature of special science laws and part of 
the reason why special science laws have to be qualified by having ceteris paribus clauses. 
The point here is that the macro law is asymmetrically dependent on the micro 
(implementing) mechanism. This example is from Fodor (1990, p. 117). Let’s assume that the 
macro law in question is A   D, and the micro level mechanism is described by the law B  
C. A  D is depends asymmetrically on B  C iff you can break the A  D connection 
without breaking the B  C connection, but not the other way around. This is the case if B  
C is necessary but not sufficient for A  D.  
  
We are assuming that both these conditionals express causal laws. Causal laws express 
informational relations, so the informational part of the story is accounted for. The relation 
between the laws is one of asymmetric dependence, something that should result in 
establishing not only information, but meaning, i.e. establishing that C means B, because that 
is the law that the other laws are dependent upon. This, of course, is not a tolerable result for 
Fodor. He solves this problem by saying this:  
 
The point of appeals to asymmetric dependence in theories of content is to show how tokens of the 
same type could have heterogeneous causes compatible with their all meaning the same thing; i.e., it’s 
to show how robustness is possible. Correspondingly, if a sufficient condition for content is going to be 
fashioned in terms of asymmetric dependence, it must advert to the dependence of one causal law about 
“X” tokens upon another causal law about “X” tokens. But the sort of asymmetric dependencies that 
interlevel cases generate don’t meet this condition. What we have in these cases is a law that governs 
the tokening of one thing (Ds in the example) that’s dependent on a law that governs the tokening of 
some other thing (Cs in the example). This sort of asymmetric dependence doesn’t produce robustness, 
so it’s not semantically relevant. (Fodor, 1990, p. 117) 
 
As we mentioned above there is a restriction on the theory that only dependencies that have 
the same type of symbol as consequents are potentially robust, and hence constitutive for 
meaning. He says: “… if a sufficient condition for content is going to be fashioned in terms of 
asymmetric dependence, it must advert to the dependence of one causal law about “X” tokens 
upon another causal law about “X” tokens.” (Fodor, 1990, p. 117). This seems to have the 
consequence that if we consider the problem of pan-semanticism we see that the dependencies 
that could have solved the problem are disqualified by assumption. These considerations, I 
claim, seem to imply that appealing to asymmetric dependencies cannot account for the pan-
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semanticism case. This disqualifies Fodor’s solution if we read the above quote in a way that 
makes the consequents the same, i.e. the non-literal way. When we do so, we see that Fodor 
does not solve the right problem, i.e. the pan-semanticism problem, but a problem about 
robustness. If we read him literally in the quote, so that he appeals to asymmetric 
dependencies between laws that do not have the same consequents, he breaks his own 
criterion for robustness, as quoted above. Let us see if Fodor can still account for pan-
semanticism by using what he says about inter level relations and causal chains.  
  
If we read the Fodor quote describing how he deals with the pan-semanticism worry literally, 
we see that the case is very similar to the causal chain case quoted below. Fodor’s solution to 
the pan-semanticism case looks, on the literal reading to be an instance of a causal chain 
where the different parts of the chain depend asymmetrically on each other. The literal way of 
reading Fodor’s solution to the pan-semanticism problem is reading the fire  smoke 
connection as being asymmetrically dependent on the smoke  “smoke” connection. Let us 
for the moment ignore that this disqualifies it from potentially being robust. This, due to the 
transitivity of the information relation, can be reconstructed as a causal chain such as A  B 
 C where A is fire, B is smoke and C is “smoke”. We remember from the pan-semanticism 
case that the answer Fodor needs for his theory not to imply pan-semanticism is that C means 
B, and not A because the A  C connection is asymmetrically dependent on the B  C 
connection. So, it is, I think, surprising to see what he says about the causal chain case: 
 
Suppose that As (qua As) cause Bs (qua Bs), and Bs (qua Bs) cause Cs (qua Cs), and assume that As are 
sufficient but not necessary for the Bs. Then the law A  C is asymmetrically dependent on the law B  
C. Why doesn’t it follow that Cs mean B? Answer: Because, although the causal chain makes the A  C 
connection asymmetrically depend the B  C connection, the dependence of Cs on Bs that it engenders 
is not ipso facto robust, and content requires not just causal dependence but robustness too. The 
dependence of Cs on Bs is robust only if there are non-B-caused Cs. But the causal chain A  B  C, 
engenders an asymmetric dependence in which all the A-caused Cs are also B-caused. So the 
asymmetric dependence of A  C on B  C doesn’t satisfy the conditions on robustness; so it is not 
semantically relevant. (Fodor, 1990, p. 118) 
 
I claim that on the literal reading of Fodor’s treatment of the pan-semanticism case what he 
says constitutes a case similar to the causal chain case. Fodor’s argument in the pan-
semanticism case purports to show that “smoke” means smoke, and that smoke does not mean 
fire. This is the right result for dispelling pan-semanticism. However, in the causal chain case, 
Fodor’s account, which I argue is analogous to the literal reading of the pan-semanticism 
case, does not produce the right result, namely that C (“smoke”)  means B (smoke). He denies 
56 
 
that C means B. If what I claim is right and the arguments are analogous then Fodor seems to 
provide contradicting results.   
 
Are the cases only superficially alike, or is there an actual structural likeness? Several things 
are alike. Both cases exhibit, at least on the literal reading, a causal chain where the whole is 
dependent on the part in a way that makes the dependence asymmetrical. As we have seen this 
apparently is not sufficient for meaning. There is another requirement, namely that the 
dependence should produce robustness. This provides us with another clue as to how to 
understand asymmetric dependence. Consider the sentence: “The dependence of Cs on Bs is 
robust only if there are non-B-caused Cs.” (Fodor, 1990, p. 118). This seems to say that for C 
to be robust, i.e. meaningful, none of the causes that are sufficient for causing C can be 
necessary. In the causal chain case we see that B is necessary for C, by assumption.  
  
If we insert the pan-semanticism case into the causal chain case above we get that fire (qua 
fire (A)) causes smoke (qua smoke (B)), and smoke (qua smoke (B)) causes “smoke” (qua 
“smoke” (C)). And, we can assume that fire (A) is sufficient but not necessary for smoke (B). 
Why, then, do the two cases come out differently? It seems that to make the latter case come 
out right one needs to assume that Bs are necessary for Cs. That is the only way to guarantee 
that Cs are not robust. Fodor does not assume this in the pan-semanticism case where 
“smoke” is free to be caused by other things than smoke, and one gets the asymmetric 
dependencies between the right kinds of laws, i.e. laws that aren’t apart of chains, and 
“smoke” means smoke. When we set up the case this way we see that by assuming that Bs are 
necessary for Cs we can get the right result: that C does not mean B. Though we will not 
pursue the matter here I think there is a possibility inherent in talking about ceteris paribus 
laws that one can challenge Fodor’s assumption that in inter level cases the Bs will always be 
necessary and thereby try to show that inter level cases can produce robustness.   
 
4.5.  Conclusion  
We have seen that the condition for robustness is that when appealing to asymmetric 
dependences among laws those laws must have the same consequents. We saw that there are 
two ways of reading Fodor’s treatment of the pan-semanticism case, one literal and one non-
literal. On the non-literal reading where we read the paragraph as satisfying the condition for 
robustness we see that Fodor does not account for the pan-semanticism case in a satisfactory 
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manner. Instead he assumes a substantive notion of symbol-hood which does all the work of 
dispelling the pan-semanticism worry. This substantive notion of symbol-hood is not 
accounted for naturalistically, and is therefore, I argue, not available for Fodor in dispelling 
the pan-semanticism worry.  
 
On the literal reading of Fodor’s treatment we saw that it is structurally similar to the way 
Fodor accounts for inter level relations and causal chains. By exploiting the similarity 
between the pan-semanticism case and the causal chain case I argued that Fodor risks 
contradicting himself. Fodor can avoid the contradiction by assuming that “smoke” has no 
necessary sufficient cause, something which is plausible. I conclude that the literal line of 
argument can account for the pan-semanticism worry, but at a cost I do not think Fodor could 
accept. His options are, as I see it, to provide an independent account of a substantive notion 
of symbol-hood that explains how it is possible to read the pan-semanticism case in what we 
have been calling the non-literal way. The prospects for this, I think, are challenging. The 
other option (the literal argument) is to loosen the condition for robustness, i.e. to allow 
semantically relevant asymmetric dependencies between laws that do not have the same 
consequents. This is to allow what we have been calling the literal reading of the paragraph. If 
this is purchased at the cost of accounting for robustness, which it appears to be, it is surely 
not an option for Fodor.. This concludes this chapter. In the next chapter we will continue to 
investigate if Fodor’s theory can account for robustness by seeing whether it accounts for the 
Twin Earth cases.  
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5. Chapter V: Twin Earth  
 
 
In the last chapter we saw Fodor’s proposal for dealing with the pan-semanticism worry and I 
argued that it is not satisfactory. Now we will look at some of the other challenges to Fodor’s 
proposed solution to the disjunction problem, particularly the ones that have to do with the 
modal aspects of the theory. Since Fodor does not think highly of speaking in terms of 
possible worlds we will not take him as fully committed to such views (Fodor, 1990, p. 95). 
But, since it is the way he formulates the theory, and it is not obvious what other way it can be 
formulated, there is some commitment to analyzing elements of the theory in terms of 
possible worlds. We will also see that Fodor is committed to a form of verificationism. This is 
important in that it introduces an epistemological aspect and thus a break with the purely 
metaphysical considerations up until now. We will also see that the verificationism is closely 
connected with the way Fodor accounts for the contents of kind terms. This has important 
implications for another view Fodor holds, namely intentional atomism. Intentional atomism 
is the view that it is possible for systems to have a single intentional state. I will argue that 
though this might be possible, Fodor’s account excludes the possibility of this state having a 
content that is the same as the content of a kind term. What this amounts to we will see below.   
  
The main concern in this chapter is that the informational approaches to semantics, being a 
species of what is called content externalism, need to be able to account for what normally are 
referred to as Twin Earth cases, or problems. There are numerous variants of the Twin Earth 
cases, but all involve reference to worlds that are similar to ours but different in some crucial 
aspect. The standard (Fodor, 1994, p. 22-26) example owes to Putnam and is usually taken to 
be an argument for content externalism, i.e. the view that content does not supervene only on 
aspects internal to the organism that is in the states that have content. Content externalism 
claims that content does not supervene merely on the internal states of the organism, rather, 
content supervenes on the internal states of the organism plus states external to the organism. 
The view opposing content externalism is content internalism. This view is that content does 
in fact supervene only on internal facts about the individual having the state with content. 
Some forms of the latter view imply holism about content, but this is a consequence only of 
one holds that there is no analytic/synthetic distinction, something Fodor does. We will not 
discuss this debate in what follows. Let us see what the standard Twin Earth case is.  
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5.1. Standard Case  
Putnam’s classic argument for content externalism can be formulated like this (Fodor, 1990, 
p. 114-115): Assume a world that is physically exactly like our world, with one exception. 
Instead of the chemical substance H2O, which we have in abundance in our world, there is the 
equally abundant substance XYZ. XYZ, though having a radically different chemical makeup 
than H2O, shares all of the macro properties of H2O, i.e. it tastes the same, you can use it to 
cook, fish live in it, etc. In other words, the world we are assuming is a perfect copy of our 
own except that all the H2O in our world is replaced with XYZ. Now, assume we make a 
perfect clone of some individual from our world and put him in the Twin world. The clone is 
a perfect copy and is internally identical to the original. We are, of course, ignoring the 
problems raised by the fact that the human body consists largely of H2O.  
  
The two individuals are, by assumption, identical, including their internal mental states. The 
question is whether this fact implies that the content of their mental states are also identical. Is 
the fact that their internal states are identical enough to secure that the contents of their mental 
states are identical? When they use the word “water” to talk about the substance before them 
that is wet, that they use to cook, that fish live in etc., they are not talking about the same 
stuff. What they are referring to are by assumption different substances. So, do “water” -
tokens, either in their brains or when they talk, mean the same thing or have the same content? 
Fodor, and all other externalists, think no. “Water” means two different things in the different 
worlds because they refer to different substances even though the people entertaining them are 
internally identical. This seems to imply that content cannot supervene only on the internal 
facts about the individual, but must also take into account external facts about the 
environment. This is a result Fodor’s theory must account for.  
  
We can think of the example above as the basic formula for the Twin cases. All the variants 
include some sort of indistinguishable external kind who partly determine content, and an 
individual who is by assumption ruled out as the source of the differing content. This point 
can also be expressed by appealing to how we individuate content. A thing is individuated 
when conditions are given that uniquely specifies that thing. We can say that when something 
is individuated it is done by specifying features of the X such that the X is a uniquely 
60 
 
determined individual. The Twin cases seem to show that to individuate mental states is not 
sufficient for the individuation of their content. 
 
The Twin Earth cases, I think, strongly suggest that content supervenes not only on the 
internal states of the individual, but also on external states. If this is the case, it seems that the 
internalist cannot account for content. But the Twin Earth argument shows that to individuate 
the content you need more theoretical resources than to individuate the mental state, namely 
you need to appeal to the reference of the mental state, an external fact, to individuate the 
content.  
  
It is the individuation story that is our main concern here. To give a naturalistic story about 
content is to give naturalistic specifiable conditions for the individuation of the content of a 
mental state. I take the Twin Earth case to imply that internalist theories, such as we have 
defined them, cannot account for content. But it is not obvious that Fodor can either, and, as 
we shall see, his answer has some interesting epistemological implications. But what is the 
problem the Twin cases pose that Fodor must account for? 
 
The worry that needs to be dispelled by a theory of meaning is that the Twin cases might 
imply that “water” means XYZ when the intuition is that XYZ is not in the extension of 
“water”. That “water” has XYZ in its extension is intuitively the wrong result, because the 
intuition is that “water” only has H2O in its extension. These intuitions are plausibly 
connected with the fact that we are likely to think about the Twin cases in terms of 
dispositions and counterfactuals. In light this, the Twin cases can seem to imply about 
ordinary English speakers that if they were magically (or otherwise) to be transported to the 
Twin world they would be disposed to call XYZ for water, i.e. apply “water” to XYZ. After 
all, XYZ does not distinguish itself in any way from H2O, so there would be no reason to not 
apply “water” to XYZ. Cases where the world contains both substances will be addressed 
below. It is this disposition to apply “water” to XYZ that creates the problem for Fodor in that 
this would seem to imply that the best way to describe the extension of “water” is by the 
disjunction “H2O or XYZ”, which we have seen in earlier cases, imply that “water” means 
something disjunctive, which it does not. So, Twin Earth cases seem to present another type 
of disjunction problem that needs to be accounted for. As we saw earlier, a theory of meaning 
like Fodor’s must reconstruct the right extensions of symbols to be satisfactory.  
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In his solution to this problem Fodor (1990, p. 115) appeals to the fact that “water” is a kind 
term and that part of what it is to be using terms as kind terms is to treat them in accordance 
with certain intentions. He thinks, reasonably, that treating things as natural kinds involves 
having intentions to treat all the objects in the environment that one takes to be relevantly 
similar, as the same kind. Things that are taken as being not of a kind, e.g., that they are 
relevantly dissimilar, are not covered by the same kind term. He also notes (Fodor, 1990, p. 
115) that not all expressions are controlled by such intentions, but they are not natural kind 
terms. How does appealing intentions help to secure the result Fodor needs, namely that 
“water” only has H2O in its extension? 
 
5.2. Verificationism 
 
My point is that the intention to use “water” only of stuff of the same kind as the local samples has the 
effect of making its applications to XYZ asymmetrically dependent on its applications to H2O ceteris 
paribus. Given that people are disposed to treat “water” as a kind term (and, of course, given that the 
local samples are all in fact H2O) it follows that – all else equal – they would apply it to XYZ only when 
they would apply it to H2O; specifically, they would apply it to XYZ only when they mistake XYZ for 
H2O; only when (and only because) they can’t tell XYZ and H2O apart. Whereas, given a world in 
which they can tell XYZ and H2O apart (and in which their intentions with respect to “water” are the 
same as they are in this world), they will continue to apply “water” to H2O and refrain from applying it 
to XYZ. (Fodor, 1990, p. 115) 
 
We see in this paragraph that Fodor introduces two aspects of his theory which we have not so 
far considered in detail. The first is that he appeals to intentions in accounting for kind terms. 
This is something we will consider below and I will argue that this has implications for 
Fodor’s views about intentional atomism. The other is that he introduces the term “mistake” 
in its epistemological sense. Thus, the focus shifts from the conditions of truth of a symbol to 
whether or not the subject would recognize something as true. We can assume that to apply a 
word to a thing according to some intention one has is naturally thought of as performing an 
action. Actions, at least intentional actions, have conditions for when they are successful and 
not. Presumably, the relevant condition in this case is that the action should correspond to the 
intention, i.e. the application of the word should only be applied to the objects that the 
intention dictates. The mistake in this case is the misapplication of the word to objects that are 
not approved by the intention, so to speak.  
 
What makes appealing to intentions epistemological is that the objects that are candidates for 
being attributed with a certain kind-hood must be recognized as such, and such recognition is 
dependent upon the possibility of deciding the truth of certain relevant conditionals, especially 
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the conditionals concerning the attributes of the object. If what one takes to be of a kind does 
not behave like the rest of its kind in some situation of other, then this is evidence for that one 
has to do with more than one kind. This implies that mistakes are dependent on the possibility 
of being right. Where there is no possibility of deciding the truth of certain conditionals, e.g. 
finding a world where some conditional is true of H2O but false of XYZ, there is no 
possibility of being right and hence there is no sense to the idea that one is wrong. In this kind 
of world “water” probably has a disjunctive extension. This is a point Fodor accepts (Fodor, 
1990, p. 119, 91). He says:  
 
… the theory I’m selling says that false tokens can happen whenever they like; only if they happen, so 
too must tokenings of other kinds: No noncow-caused “cow”s without cow-caused “cow”s; false tokens 
are metaphysically dependent on true ones. (Fodor, 1990, p. 91) 
 
This will also be evident from Fodor’s considerations about verificationism below. As we will 
see he thinks a certain amount of verificationism is unavoidable on any causal account of 
intentionality.  
 
5.3. Fodor’s Proposal  
Let us see how Fodor proposes to account for the problem posed by the Twin Earth case, and 
how he responds to some challenges to his view. Lynne Rudder Baker has presented a 
challenge to Fodor which he responds to which we will consider (Fodor, 1990, p. 103). I 
depend on Fodor’s exposition also on this case. This is a case where two kinds that are not 
distinguished share a world. This case will have some important implications as to how we 
are to understand certain features of Fodor’s theory. But first let us consider how Fodor 
accounts for the intuition that content depends on external facts.  
 
The case is this: On the Twin world the substance XYZ can cause “water” tokens. The 
informational theory’s treatment of the case has the result that “water” means XYZ because 
XYZ is in “water”’s extension. This is because, as we remember, the extension of “water”, in 
the informational theory, is specified by reference to whatever is sufficient for causing 
“water”. This result, as we saw earlier, is a bad result for a meaning theory because it does not 
conform to our intuitions that “water” means water and has H2O, and only H2O its extension. 
What we want is some way of distinguishing between the H2O caused “water” tokens and the 
XYZ caused “water” tokens. Fodor claims that there is a difference (1990, p. 115) and the 
difference is that in worlds where H2O and XYZ are indistinguishable, if you break the one 
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connection then you break both, and vice versa; but in the worlds where H2O and XYZ are 
distinguishable the following asymmetric dependence hold: if you break the H2O – “water” 
connection, you also break the XYZ – “water” connection, but not vice versa. That is, the 
H2O – “water” connection holds where all other X – “water” connections are broken, and this 
is what accounts for the fact that “water” tokens only have H2O in their extensions. This is a 
promising result. If this is true, then Fodor seems to have found a difference between XYZ 
caused and H2O caused “water” tokens. This is what is required for solving the problem. But 
this way of determining a difference does not make perspicuous what the difference consists 
in. In particular, the role of the intentions and kind terms are not explained on this account. 
Let us try to specify in what way these notions contribute to Fodor’s proposed solution. 
  
The standard Twin Earth story imagines what would happen in a world where all of the H2O 
is replaced by XYZ. And, for the people who belong in that world, “water” means XYZ and 
not H2O. But for us, were we to go to this world, “water” would mean H2O because it is true 
of us that if we performed some tests on XYZ and discovered that what we had taken to be 
H2O in fact was XYZ, we would stop using “water” in thinking and speaking of it. This is 
explained by the fact that we have intentions of using the term “water” only of things that has 
the chemical make-up H2O.  
 
As we mentioned above there are interesting cases of the Twin Earth argument where one 
takes the same world to contain both of the relevant substances. Fodor looks at several of 
these cases. We will consider what he says about Baker’s robot-cat case (Fodor, 1990, p. 
103). This is a world where there are both regular, ordinary cats, and artificial cats, i.e. robot-
cats which look and act just as ordinary cats. We also have a person S whose mental symbol 
“cat” has only ever been caused by robot-cats. Then, one day, S experiences a “cat” tokening 
that is caused by a real cat. The question is what the meaning of that particular “cat” token is? 
According to Fodor (1990, p. 103), Baker thinks that there are three alternatives, none of 
which she thinks is tolerable.  
 
The alternatives are: (i) the “cat” token means cat and is true of the cat, (ii) the “cat” token 
means robot-cat and is false of the cat, and (iii) the “cat” token means something disjunctive, 
namely cat or robot-cat, and is true of both. Baker thinks that the first one can’t be right 
because the dependence seems to be going the other way than we want, i.e. the disposition to 
token “cat” tokens when presented with a real cat seems to be asymmetrically dependent on 
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the disposition to token it when presented with robot-cats. After all, that is what has caused 
“cat” tokens so far, and presumably can cause “cat” tokens even if S never encounters any 
real cats. That the “cat” token means robot-cat is supported by the conditional: S is disposed 
to apply “cat” to robot-cats even if she never encounters any cats. But, Fodor and Baker 
claim, this too ignores relevant counterfactuals, particularly that cats would have caused “cat” 
tokens had S encountered any. Plausibly, the counterfactual governing S’ “cat’ tokenings is 
that both cats and robot-cats (that is the disjunction ‘cats or robot-cats’) can cause them, and 
that S is disposed to token “cat” of both. That S’ “cat” tokens have all been caused by robot-
cats is purely accidental. This leads us to the final alternative where “cat” means cat or robot-
cat, and is true of both. And this seems to be the disjunction problem all over again, i.e. 
ascribing a disjunctive extension to something that intuitively does not have a disjunctive 
extension.  
 
5.4.  Kind Terms 
By exhausting the options and showing how none of them can be accepted this argument 
purports to be a reductio of Fodor’s proposal. This is true if Fodor cannot accept any of the 
alternatives. But Fodor does in fact accept one of the alternatives, namely the third option: 
that “cat” means cat or robot. But how can he accept this? What is it about this case that 
makes it special, as it must be, since this is the only case we have seen so far that Fodor 
admits that a normal kind concept has a disjunctive extension? Hopefully, the explanation will 
not only explain how Fodor can hold this seemingly wrong conclusion without giving up his 
account, but also why Fodor can perform the surprising move in the original Twin Earth case, 
namely to specify the direction of the asymmetric dependence by appealing to the intentions 
of the subjects. The puzzle is how this can be a valid move given the naturalistic conditions 
that restrain the theory. Presumably, if an asymmetric dependence holds between two or more 
laws, it does not hold in virtue of the intentions of the organisms that instantiate the 
consequent of the law. If it does, it seems that Fodor’s account is not naturalistic after all. 
 
Fodor (1990, p. 104) explains that both he and Dretske share the intuition that in cases where 
the alternatives (cats and robot-cats, or H2O and XYZ) inhabit the same world, but when some 
speaker has learned “cat” from only one of the alternatives, the extension is disjunctive. Fodor 
takes the fact that only one of the alternatives actually has caused the “cat” tokens as 
accidental. The more important feature of the situation is the fact that the speaker would token 
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“cat” even if they were to be caused by cats, though they so far only have been caused by 
robot-cats. So, both the ‘cat  “cat”’ law and the ‘robot-cat  “cat”’ law are in place. Fodor 
explains his intuition why this is not a case of the disjunction problem like this:  
 
It is OK for some predicates to be disjunctive as long as not all of them are. One can perfectly 
consistently hold, on the one hand, that “cat” means robot or cat when it’s accidental that you learned it 
just from robot-cats; while denying, on the other hand, that it would mean cat or robot if you had 
learned it in a world where all you could have learned it from were robot-cats (e.g. because there aren’t 
any cats around.) Similarly, Dretske can consistently hold that “water” is true of H2O or XYZ in the 
case he describes while agreeing that it is true of H2O and false of XYZ in the case Putnam describes.  
(Fodor, 1990, p. 104) 
 
It seems that we have several different alternatives as to the types of worlds we are imagining. 
In worlds where there are cats and H2O, and no XYZ and robot-cats “cat” and “water” mean 
what they do in the actual world. In worlds where there are robot-cats and XYZ and no H2O 
and cats, “cat” and “water” would have robot-cats and XYZ in their extensions and therefore 
mean something else than they do in the actual world. In worlds where there are both cats and 
robot-cats, H2O and XYZ, “water” and “cat” have disjunctive extensions, and are true of both 
alternatives and thereby disjunctive. In a world where “cat” expresses something disjunctive I 
take it that the laws that govern “cat” tokens do not exhibit an asymmetric dependence, but 
rather a symmetric dependence. This implies that it is true of S that she would stop using 
“cat” about cats if she stopped using it about robot-cats, if she is disposed to take them to be 
the same kind.  
 
We assume that S believes that robot-cats and cats are of a kind. The features that distinguish 
the two are all internal and unavailable to S at present. But, it is presumably true that if S were 
to discover that cats and robot-cats indeed are different, she would stop treating them as being 
of a kind. Does this mean that she would decide that it was cat she really meant all along 
because she had always assumed that she was referring to, say, a biological kind and therefore 
not to robot-cats? Or does it mean the opposite? Is there a fact of the matter about what other 
intentions govern the tokens of “cat” such that it answers the question? The example does not 
say. But let us ask what happens when S does find out that what she took to be of a kind 
actually was not, and that she had been mistaken all along. Fodor asks: “If [S’] “cat” tokens 
meant cat or robot, then they were true of both the cats and the robots that she applied them 
to. Is she, then, mistaken to suppose that she was mistaken?” (Fodor, 1990, p. 105). Fodor 
distinguishes between what he calls an easy and an interesting answer to this question. The 
easy answer is that S’ mistake was to not distinguish between cats and robot-cats, and that is 
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what explains her misapplication of “cat” to robot-cats. It seems that her application of “cat” 
to both cats and robot-cats is true and not a mistake given her disposition to treat them as of 
the same kind. It is treating them as being of the same kind that is the mistake. In S’ 
application of “cat”, in her mouth, so to speak, “cat” meant something disjunctive.  
 
The interesting answer clarifies this point, I think. Fodor introduces a difference between the 
notions “being in the extension of” and “meaning that”. We have been taken this to be 
roughly equivalent up until now, because it is by specifying the extension of a term that you 
on the informational theory determine the meaning. But meaning and extension are separate 
notions in the following manner. Something can be in the extension of a term without the term 
therefore expressing what is in its extension. Fodor is using ‘to mean x’ as meaning ‘to 
express the concept x’. He says:  
 
…if S used to use “cat” in the way that Baker imagines, [then] cats and robots were both in its 
extension. But this doesn’t, of course, imply that S used “cat” to express the disjunctive concept CAT 
OR ROBOT (i.e. to mean cat or robot). Quite the contrary, S couldn’t have used “cat” to express that 
concept because, by assumption, she didn’t have that concept. Nobody can have the concept CAT OR 
ROBOT unless he has the constituent concepts CAT and ROBOT; which by assumption, S didn’t. 
(Fodor, 1990, p. 105) 
 
So, one cannot conclude from the fact that an extension is disjunctive and that what is meant 
by the symbol expressing the extension is disjunctive that the symbol itself is disjunctive. 
Primitive symbols can have disjunctive extensions (from our point of view), and so it is in this 
case. The mistake S made was not a misapplication of “cat” to robot-cats. Her applications 
were in fact true. The reason why she applied “cat” to robot cats was, according to Fodor, 
‘because she took it that the robots that she called “cats” had a certain nondisjunctive property 
which they shared with everything else in the set {cats U robots}.’ (Fodor, 1990, p. 105). 
Fodor continues by saying that what she learns is that there is no such property, and that the 
only property shared by cats and robot-cats is the disjunctive one of being a cat or robot-cat. 
So, S’ mistake was not to falsely apply “cat” to robot-cats, but rather to assume that 
everything she applied ‘cat’ to shares a common property. 
 
This seems to be the same point Fodor makes in discussing the case with H2O and XYZ, i.e. 
that what the extension of a term contains is sensitive to the intentions of the speakers. By 
having the intention to use a term as a kind term the speaker is committed to applying the 
term only of stuff that are indistinguishable in local samples, or at a minimum that they are 
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not obviously distinguishable. But as we observed before, intentions are not available as a 
theoretical notion in a naturalistic theory of content. So, how can we, by using non-intentional 
vocabulary formulate the same point as we have been using intentions to do? One way is to 
think of this use of intentions as meaning dispositions for applying terms to things. This can 
perhaps be construed as a psychological law that states that humans are disposed to apply kind 
terms only of things that are not obviously dissimilar. These dispositions can be specified in 
terms of counterfactuals, and, as we have seen, Fodor reserves the right to postulate what 
counterfactuals are to be counted as true on account of only being committed to providing a 
sufficient and not necessary condition for intentionality (1990, p. 94). And, as we will get 
back to, it is clear that Fodor assumes some facts about the psychology of both humans and 
other organisms in formulating the theory.  
 
It seems clear that what counterfactuals are true of a given speaker S at some time depend 
crucially on the epistemic situation S is in. This means that some counterfactuals have 
antecedents that can be instantiated by a change in S’ epistemic status. This is obvious from 
the fact that S’ “cat”-dispositions changed when she discovered that what she had taken cats 
to be really were two distinct kinds of things, namely cats and robot-cats. Whether one wants 
to describe this as the existing disposition changing or S’ acquiring a new disposition is, as far 
as I can see, of no consequence. But, we can ask, what happens to S when she learns that what 
she used to think of as cats turned out to be robot-cats? Her disposition to use the term “cat” 
of robot-cats is surely gone. This, presumably, translates into a new counterfactual that is true 
of S, e.g. were she to be exposed to a robot-cat she would not use the word “cat” of it. This is 
a counterfactual that, by assumption, is not true before she learns the difference, evident by 
the fact that she did use “cat” of robot-cats.  
 
This section has been about various intuitions and cases that add up to being about how Fodor 
aims to solve the problem posed by the Twin Earth cases. The rest of this chapter will be 
about the role intentions play in Fodor’s account. I will argue that Fodor’s commitment to 
intentions has implications for his commitment to intentional atomism. We will also consider 
the proposal made some paragraphs back, namely to analyze intentions in terms of 
dispositions and counterfactuals and thereby satisfy the requirement that the theory should be 
naturalistic. “Intention”, as we know, is an intentional term. 
 
 
68 
 
5.5.  Intentions 
We have seen that Fodor’s solution to the Twin cases involve appealing to the intentions of 
the subjects. We have also seen that it is necessary for a term to be a kind term that it is 
governed by an intention to use the term as a kind term. In this section we will consider some 
implications of this view, in particular whether this view is compatible with Fodor’s 
commitments to intentional atomism. Let us first see whether Fodor’s notion of intention here 
can reasonably be replaced by a notion of disposition. As we established before, the notion of 
intention cannot have a substantive role in a naturalistic theory. Even though it can be retorted 
that appealing to intentions is admissible in an independent account of kind terms, and it this 
Fodor has and he merely uses his independently motivated account of kind terms in the 
context of naturalization, I argue that this nevertheless has the consequence that kind terms 
are incompatible with intentional atomism. If this is true it means that in a mind that has only 
one intentional state, this state cannot have a content that is equivalent to the content of a kind 
term. 
 
Fodor sometimes appeals to the psychology of both humans and other organisms in deciding 
which counterfactuals are true in a given disjunction problem. The frog, he says, necessarily 
mistakes little black dots for flies, and that is the reason why the content of the frogs’ state 
when it sees a fly is little-black-dot (Fodor, 1990, p. 108). Since it is impossible for the frog to 
differentiate between the two alternatives, there are worlds where there are no flies where 
frogs still snap at little black dots, but not the other way around. What role do these 
assumptions about psychology play in solving these problems? Can one suppose that frog-
hood implies (ceteris paribus) a set of laws that describe the frogs’ dispositions in such a way 
that these cases end up having the right result?  
  
Fodor sums up his point about psychology in this paragraph. He compares the frog to 
Macbeth, who, famously, made mistakes concerning daggers. Macbeth’s problem is 
analogous to the frog’s in that the frog also makes mistakes, namely mistaking black dots for 
flies. The Macbeth case can be seen, as Fodor does, to be a problem of misrepresentation, i.e. 
a symbol tokening (‘dagger’) that is caused by something not in its extension (dagger-
appearances). This is what he says:  
 
There is no world compatible with the perception mechanisms of frogs in which they can avoid 
mistaking black dots for flies. Whereas even if, freakishly, I mistake all the dagger appearances I 
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actually come across for daggers; and even if, still more freakishly, I never do recover from any of these 
mistakes, still, that would be an accident since it is nomologically consonant with the way that I’m 
constructed that I should distinguish daggers from dagger appearances some of the time. But it is not 
nomologically consonant with the way that frogs are constructed that they should ever distinguish black 
dots from flies. So Macbeth and I have dagger detectors and not dagger-or-dagger-appearance detectors 
but frogs have black-dot detectors and not fly detectors. (Fodor, 1990, p. 108)            
 
Let us review the case with the cats in light of what Fodor says here. When S sees what she 
takes to be cats, let us suppose the mental symbol “cat” is tokened in her brain. Unbeknownst 
to S, her “cat” symbol has a disjunctive extension and applies to objects of several kinds, 
more precisely both cats and robot-cats, which are indistinguishable from real cats. Not 
indistinguishable in principle, only their appearance and behavior are indistinguishable. What 
distinguishes S from the frogs is that S’ psychology is such that presented with evidence that 
what she until now has taken to be the same kind is in fact two distinct kinds, she will stop 
applying “cat” in the way that she used to. Specifically, it is true of S that when she 
encounters a robot-cat she will no longer apply the term “cat” to it. What are responsible for 
S’ ability to revise her own applications of “cat” are features of her psychology, specifically 
the features that govern kind terms. Earlier we saw that Fodor appealed to S’ intentions for 
explaining this, and that this, arguably, is not allowed on a naturalistic account.  
 
We are trying to determine what features of psychology that can be assumed on this picture? 
There is reason to be restrictive, because the theory Fodor proposes claims to be not only 
sufficient and naturalistic, but also atomistic (Fodor, 1994, p. 6). Atomism is the view that 
systems can have only one intentional state. If the content of a kind term is dependent on the 
intention of treating the term as a kind term, it seems that a system that has an intentional state 
that has the content of a kind term necessarily needs to also have another intentional state: the 
intention that secures that the first intentional state is a kind term. The consequence is that 
intentional states that have kind term contents imply at least one other intentional state. This 
amounts to the system not being atomistic in the relevant sense. I think this is a serious 
challenge for Fodor’s commitment to intentional atomism. Kind terms are abundant in both 
natural languages and, it seems, in our conceptual vocabularies. We have seen that kind terms 
are terms we require to be about things that are relevantly similar to each other. It is safe to 
assume, I think, that we can conclude that if Fodor uses intentions in accounting for kind 
terms and contents that amount to the contents of kind terms, then these contents will not be 
admissible to figure in an atomistic system. And just as important, they cannot figure in 
examples of atomistic systems such as this:  
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Intentional theories are, on the face of them, atomistic about content. If all that matters to whether your 
thought is about dogs is how it is causally connected to dogs, then, prima facie, it would be possible for 
you to have dog thoughts even if you didn’t have thoughts about anything else. (Fodor, 1994, p. 6) 
 
But, as we have seen, thoughts about dogs are not just determined by their connection to dogs, 
they are partly determined by the intention to treat dogs as a kind. The content of “dog” and 
other kind term contents cannot figure in atomistic system, or so I have argued. 
 
5.6.  Conclusion 
In (Fodor, 1990, p. 115 - 116) Fodor seems to think of the intentions governing kind terms as 
dispositions for applying the kind terms, and uses the terms interchangeably. Let us see if we 
can determine if intentions can be reconstructed in terms of dispositions. We have seen that in 
the original Twin Earth example it is assumed that the speaker intends the term used as a 
natural kind term, with the implication that the term will not be used of obviously dissimilar 
things. This has the result “of making the semantically relevant asymmetric dependencies true 
of his use of the word.” (Fodor, 1990, p. 116) He continues by saying that Baker doesn’t say 
if S uses the word “cat” as a kind term or not, and that he assumes that S doesn’t in her 
example.  
  
So, Baker’s “cat” means cat or robot because, on the one hand, S would (indeed does) use “cat” for 
either; and, on the other, there’s nothing in Baker’s description of the case that suggests a mechanism 
(such as an intention to use “cat” as a kind-term) that would make the use for the robots asymmetrically 
dependent upon the use for the cats (or vice versa). (Fodor, 1990, p. 116)  
 
Fodor assumes that S does not have an intention to use “cat” as a kind term (1990, p. 116). 
How reasonable is this claim? Even though Baker does not explicitly state that S does intend 
to use “cat” as a kind term it seems from the description of the case that this is what S does. 
Her response to finding out that cats and robot-cats are actually very dissimilar is evidence of 
this. To assume that if S had no intention of using “cat” as a kind term then she would not 
stop using “cat” of both cats and robot-cats when she found out that they are dissimilar is 
plausible, I think. It is plausible because the counterfactual ‘if S finds a dissimilarity between 
cats and robot-cats she will stop using “cat” indiscriminately of them’, one that is true by 
assumption, plausibly implies that the likeness of cats and robot-cats is relevant to S’ use of 
the term “cat”. So, if we’re assuming that the fact that S stops using “cat” of robot-cats is not 
an arbitrary fact about S, but something that is consonant with S’ psychology, then we can 
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assume that S has a standing disposition to use “cat” as a kind term, since this disposition just 
is to stop using a kind-term of things that one discovers are unlike.  
 
It is not clear that Fodor does, in fact, assume that intentions can be analyzed in terms of 
dispositions and counterfactuals. I think it is more reasonable to think that appealing to 
intentions is Fodor’s way of accounting for kind terms in general. The appeal to intentions is 
then imported in to the theory of content in accounting for the content of kind terms. I have 
argued that this implies a challenge to Fodor’s atomism theses. To assume that intentions can 
be reduced to dispositions is tantamount to solving the naturalization problem by assumption. 
I do not think it is likely that Fodor does this. Now that we have seen how Fodor deals with 
the Twin Earth cases we have stated the theory with enough precision to consider some 
arguments that are critical of his position. In the next chapter we will mainly consider Paul 
Boghossian’s argument that Fodor’s theory is really a type I theory in disguise, and that being 
a type I theory it is subject to problems. By reviewing this objection, and related objections, I 
hope to be able to assess the features of Fodor’s theory we have focused on in this thesis. 
These features, naturally, are those that concern the theory’s ability to account for the three 
intuitions we mentioned at the outset, except the implication of pan-semanticism which we 
concluded chapter 4 by arguing that Fodor does not convincingly account for. So, the next 
chapter will mainly be about trying to asses Fodor’s theory in light of the intuitions that 
meaning should be robust and the intuition that a theory of meaning should be accounted for 
naturalistically. 
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6. Chapter VI: Objections and Replies 
 
 
Fodor’s theory has been widely criticized by many different people, for many different 
reasons. In this chapter we will review an objection made by Paul A. Boghossian in the book 
Meaning in Mind (Loewer and Rey, 1991). The book is a collection of articles criticizing 
many aspects of Fodor’s theory, and Boghossian’s is of particular interest to us. It is 
interesting in particular because the objections are aimed at the parts of Fodor’s theory that we 
have been considering, in particular issues surrounding the verificationist aspects of the 
theory. We have also discussed some of the modal features of Fodor’s theory, and in this 
section we will consider Boghossian’s objection to how Fodor determines distance between 
the possible worlds. Boghossian’s argues that Fodor’s theory does not account for the 
robustness of meaning. It does so by constructing a version of the Twin Earth case that is 
supposed to imply that Fodor’s theory cannot in that case ascribe correct extensions to kind 
terms. As we will see, Fodor tries to block Boghossian’s argument by attacking the main 
premise, but I will argue that he is unsuccessful. We will also find reason to believe that 
Boghossian’s objection poses a real challenge to Fodor’s theory.  
 
Boghossian’s argument is a complex one, and we will go through it in detail. As we said, 
Fodor has responded to the argument so we will review his response as well. Boghossian 
argues that the asymmetric dependency theory is a type I theory in disguise. This is the 
premise for all the other arguments in his article and thus the most important aspect of his 
argument against Fodor. Fodor, as we saw earlier, argues extensively against type I theories. 
Boghossian agrees with Fodor’s arguments against the teleological type I theories and 
considers them to be fatal (Boghossian, 1991, p. 68). Fodor argues, as we saw, that it is not 
only the teleological variant of the type I theory that is wrong, rather it is the whole project of 
defining a meaning-determining situation where what causes a symbol necessarily is in the 
symbols extension, i.e. relying on a substantive distinction between type I and type II 
situations in the first place. Boghossian claims that this is just what Fodor does, and thus is 
subject to his own arguments. Boghossian’s main argument is, as we will see, that any 
specification of a type I situation will not yield unique content ascriptions because it cannot 
rule out the possibility that the symbol is caused by something not in its extension. We 
remember from before that type I theories are theories that define a meaning determining 
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situation where the symbol necessarily is caused by what is in its extension. For example, in a 
type I situation, if the symbol “dog” is caused it was necessarily caused by dogs. 
Boghossian’s argument aims to show that such a situation is impossible, with the consequence 
that no type I theory produces correct content ascriptions. As we will see, the reason for this is 
the type I theory’s inherent verificationist aspects. Boghossian aims to offer a counter-
example to Fodor’s theory by showing (i) that Fodor’s theory is a type I theory, and (ii) that 
type I theories do not produce univocal content ascriptions. If this argument is true, the 
conclusion is that Fodor’s theory has not accounted for the robustness of meaning and is thus 
not a satisfactory account of meaning. Let us see the first stage of Boghossian’s argument. 
 
6.1.  Fodor and Type I Theories 
What reason does Boghossian have for claiming that Fodor’s theory is of the type I kind? We 
have seen that type I theories are theories that define a situation that is such that only the 
referent of a symbol can cause the symbol to be tokened. This is to say that only what is in the 
extension of the symbol can cause it (here we mean extension in the normal sense, i.e. dogs, 
and nothing else, is in the extension of “dog”). As we have seen, the teleological version of 
this approach suffers from several difficulties. We have focused on that the teleological 
theories do not provide a solution to the disjunction problem because they make the content 
ascriptions of the mental states depend on univocal functional ascriptions to the mechanism 
that realizes the mental state. We concluded part I of the theses with the result that Fodor’s 
arguments against this approach are convincing.  
 
Boghossian makes a point that Fodor does not consider very much, namely the assumption 
that the cognitive mechanisms are never selected for hiding rather than tracking the truth 
(Boghossian, 1991, p. 68). I think that this is a valid concern, both in considering the 
functional individuation of biological kinds, but also considered as a general intuition. This is 
for the same reasons I outlined earlier in considering the intuition that when a belief is false, 
something in the belief forming mechanisms have malfunctioned. We will not pursue the 
matter further here. Boghossian also mentions perhaps the most important counterexample to 
type I theories, namely tokenings in thought that are caused by other thoughts. We saw this 
point earlier, but it is worth repeating. This point challenges the assumption that, ‘”when 
things go right” S will be tokened only in application to its referent’ (Boghossian, 1991, p. 
68). Thoughts can cause other thoughts without thereby being tokened only in application to 
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their referents. We saw that horse thoughts can be caused by cowboy thoughts. This is the 
most important aspect of what we have been calling the robustness of meaning. Thoughts 
mean what they do regardless of what happens to cause them in a particular instance. The 
teleological theory cannot account for this feature of meaning. This is not because it is 
teleological, but because it is a type I theory. Type I theories are dependent upon being able to 
non-intentionally and non-semantically specify a situation where a symbol is guaranteed to be 
caused by its referent, a specification we have seen convincing reasons not to believe is 
forthcoming. 
 
The asymmetric dependency relation is what, for Fodor, is supposed to determine what causal 
relation is the meaning-determining one. S means P if “S is caused by X” is asymmetrically 
dependent upon “S is caused by P”. This means that if P is not able to cause S then nothing is. 
But not the other way around, i.e. any non-P can stop being able to cause S without this 
effecting P’s ability to cause S. Boghossian observes a possibility implicit in this definition it 
is important to get out of the way, so to speak, before we move on (Boghossian, 1991, p. 70). 
Fodor also considers this possibility (Fodor, 1990, p. 108-110). The definition seems to open 
for the possibility of symbols being dependent on their proximal causes and not their distal 
ones. The reason is this: if one makes the proximal cause of a symbol, say, a horse image on 
the retina, unable to cause “horse” tokens, then horses are also made unable to cause “horse” 
tokens, and presumably nothing will cause “horse” tokens. And conversely, if you make the 
horse unable to cause “horse” tokens, then, presumably, horse images on the retina will still 
cause “horse” tokens.  This is plausible because it is plausible that horses cause “horse” 
tokens in virtue of their proximal projections, i.e. producing horse-images of some kind on the 
retina. Since there are indefinitely many ways horses can produce proximal projections, this 
leads us to conclude that horse caused “horse” tokens are asymmetrically dependent upon a 
disjunction of proximal projections. So the meaning of “horse” is not horse, but the 
disjunction of proximal projections. It is important to note that nothing depends upon that the 
proximal projection is some kind of image on the retina. The important point is that the 
proximal cause of the symbol tokening is the asymmetric dependency base for the other 
causes, and thus constitutes the meaning of the symbol. This is, of course, the wrong result for 
the theory to imply. 
 
Fodor answers this objection (Fodor, 1990, p. 108-110) by pointing out that just about any 
proximal cause can cause a symbol tokening like “horse”. This is because belief fixation is 
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open-ended and holistic (Boghossian, 1991, p. 70). This means that “horse” tokens are theory 
mediated, so that what you take to be evidence for there being horses about, depends upon 
your theory about horses. This has the result that any evidence can be taken as evidence that 
there are horses about and then cause a “horse” tokening. Fodor claims that the disjunction of 
proximal projections is not eligible as an asymmetric dependency base because the 
disjunction is open, and open disjunctions cannot be the referents of primitive symbols. At 
least, that is what Boghossian takes Fodor to mean (Boghossian, 1991, p. 70). A more 
important reason is that proximal causes are not eligible for entering into the causal 
generalizations which are potentially meaning-determining, i.e. causal laws. What we are left 
with as candidates for the asymmetric dependence bases are the distal causes.  
 
6.2. Possible Worlds and the Distance Metric 
Boghossian makes a remark that is clarifying, I think. The theory states that “cow” has cows 
in its extension but not cats because the cat  “cow” law is asymmetrically dependent upon 
the cow  “cow” law. He says: 
 
Put in the language of possibilia, this seems best interpreted as suggesting that “cow” has cows in its 
extension and not cats, provided that although there are worlds in which cow can cause a “cow” token 
but cat can’t, there are no worlds in which cat can cause a “cow” token, but cow can’t. This, however, 
can’t be precisely what’s meant. The point is, of course, that even by the theory’s own lights, there have 
to be some worlds in which the property of being a cat can cause “cow” tokens even if the property of 
being a cow can’t, for there presumably are some worlds in which “cow” means cat. (Boghossian, 1991, 
p. 71) 
 
He goes on to say, by quoting Fodor, that the theory must be stated more accurately to reflect 
this. The more accurate version is this: there needs to be a world W where (i) cows cause 
“cow”s and non-cows don’t; and (ii) W is closer to the actual world than a world where some 
non-cows cause “cows” and no cows do (Boghossian, 1991, p. 71). This has the effect of 
introducing a nearness clause for the possible worlds we are considering. What this means is 
that the relative distances between the possible worlds and the actual world is significant in 
determining content. There is very little agreement on what criterion for determining distance 
between possible worlds is the best one. The term “distance” in this context is used to capture 
differences between the possible worlds. Worlds that are significantly different from the 
actual world are thought to be farther away than worlds that are similar. Possible worlds are 
individuated by what counterfactuals are true in them. For example, there is a possible world 
where it is true that Al Gore is president. This world can be quite similar to the actual one, 
whereas a world where it is true that humans have wings is quite different. So the world 
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where humans have wings is farther away than the world where Al Gore is president because 
the fact that humans having wings is a bigger change in our planets history than Al Gore 
being elected president instead of George W. Bush is. These distances are supposed to reflect 
our intuitions about how much change particular changes imply. These intuitions may include 
such intuitions that changing a biological fact implies a bigger change than changing a 
historical fact; changing a physical fact (for example making sugar not soluble in water) is a 
bigger change than a biological change etc.  
 
The result is that the world where you have to change more to make the counterfactual true is 
the one that is the farthest away. We will see, in considering Boghossian’s argument, that 
there are semantically significant cases where this intuition of distance is problematic. What is 
important to note is not only, as in (ii), that the relevant world need to have some distance 
relation to some other worlds, but, as in (i), that there must be a world where cows cause 
“cow”s and nothing else does.  
 
6.3. Boghossian’s Argument 
Boghossian claims that Fodor’s theory, though it does not look like it, is a type I theory 
(Boghossian, 1991, p. 71). Fodor states his theory in terms of dependencies among causal 
laws which in turn are stated in terms of counterfactuals. So, the theory does not contain any 
references to situations where the referents of a symbol are the only thing that can cause it, 
which is what Boghossian takes type I theories to be (Boghossian, 1991, p. 71). This is also 
what Fodor takes type I theories to be (Fodor, 1991, p. 272). The question is whether saying 
that there is one unique world where only the meaning-determining law is in place, and none 
of the other laws that depend on the meaning determining law is tantamount to specifying a 
type I situation. Boghossian wants to show that if there is such a world, a world it seems 
Fodor is committed to the existence of, then to specify such a world is tantamount to 
specifying the type I situation required. And it is hard not to agree, I think, that to specify a 
world in which the only law that governs “horse” tokens is the one that has horses as the only 
possible cause, is tantamount to specifying a situation where a symbol can only be caused by 
something in its extension, which, as we saw, is the condition on being a type I theory. 
 
Boghossian’s argument depends on establishing that asymmetric dependence necessarily 
presupposes a world where the only causal relation that possibly can cause a symbol is what is 
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in the symbols extension. Boghossian aims to show this by showing that the only plausible 
alternative to presupposing such a world will not result in an asymmetric base for the symbol. 
If Boghossian can show that a commitment to the asymmetric dependence relation necessarily 
implies specifying a unique world where the only cause of S is P, then asymmetric 
dependence is a type I theory. Boghossian thinks he can show this by showing that the only 
other plausible alternative for formulating the asymmetric dependence relation between laws, 
i.e. without appealing to worlds that can be characterized as type I situations, is unable to 
produce dependencies that are meaning-determining and establish unique laws as the 
dependence base for symbol tokenings (Boghossian, 1991, p. 72). What is this other option? 
 
Boghossian thinks that the only other plausible way of establishing an asymmetric 
dependency base is “… a distribution of nearby worlds which contains worlds in which both P 
and Q can cause S tokens, and worlds in which both P and R can, but no world in which only 
P can and no world in which only non-Ps can …” (Boghossian, 1991, p. 72). The problem 
with this proposal is that we have no way of determining that it is the P  S law that is the 
dependency base and not the (P & R) v (P & Q)  S law. Since the theory does not provide a 
condition for deciding these cases we are forced to conclude that the dependence base in this 
case is disjunctive. Boghossian (1991, p. 72) considers the worry about how we can be sure 
that whenever we have P as a candidate as the dependency base for S we will also have (P & 
R) v (P & Q) as a candidate. One might worry that Boghossian’s case is not general. 
However, Boghossian thinks that this worry is irrelevant because the case is not required to be 
general. Since Fodor is offering a sufficient condition Boghossian thinks that “… any case in 
which S has both P and (P & R) v (P & Q) as candidate asymmetric dependence bases will be 
a case in which [Fodor’s] theory yields either the wrong result or an indeterminate one.” 
(Boghossian, 1991, p. 72). He continues by saying that the only requirement is one case where 
(P & R) v (P & Q)  S is a law whenever P  S and R  S is laws, and that he finds it 
obvious that there will be plenty such cases (Boghossian, 1991, p. 72). The problem for Fodor 
is, of course, that Boghossian’s alternative entails ascribing a disjunctive extension to P. The 
argument is intended to force Fodor to admit that his theory is a type I theory by eliminating 
his options. I do think that this is a worry Fodor needs to take seriously.  
 
Let us, for the sake of argument, assume that this argument establishes that Fodor’s theory is a 
type I theory and consider the rest of Boghossian’s argument. On the basis of this premise 
Boghossian wants to argue two further claims: (i) the enterprise of naturalistically specifying 
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a circumstance in which a symbol necessarily is caused by its referent (a type I theory) is 
impossible; and (ii) even if it were possible to specify such a circumstance we could never 
certify that we had succeeded in specifying them. The first claim is to establish that type I 
theories are impossible, and the second is that even if they were possible, we would never be 
able to know if we had succeeded in specifying one. Claim (ii), though interesting, will not be 
considered here. 
 
6.4. The Argument for the Impossibility of Type I Situations 
To establish that type I theories are impossible one needs to argue that the situation that type I 
theories depend upon, i.e. the situation where a symbol can only be caused by its referent, 
never can arise. This is achieved, we can assume, if it is shown with generality, that whenever 
a symbol is tokened in such a situation as specified, there are always more candidates than 
one for being the asymmetric dependence base for the symbol. If this is shown it will establish 
that no unique law serves as the asymmetric dependence base for any symbol, and all symbols 
will have disjunctive contents.  
 
As we have seen, Boghossian claims that it is impossible to specify a situation such that a 
symbol necessarily is caused by its referent, or, as is the same, specifying a type I situation. 
What is the argument for accepting this conclusion? Boghossian says: 
 
… any situation in which X is a possible cause of my S-tokens is also a situation in which any other 
property Y, indistinguishable from X in all physically possible circumstances accessible to me, is also a 
possible cause of my S-tokens. Since there are no physically possible circumstances accessible to me in 
which X and Y can be told apart, any circumstance in which X can cause my S tokens is also a 
circumstance in which Y can. It follows, therefore, that on a type 1 theory, if S has X in its extension, 
then it also has all these other “X-equivalent” properties equally in its extension. But is this plausible? Is 
it really true that my having a symbol that means X but not Y depends on my being able to tell Xs and 
Ys apart? After all, it surely doesn’t follow from the fact that Xs and Ys can only be told apart in worlds 
that are too far for me to get to, that being X and being Y are the same property. But, then if the 
difference between being X and being Y is real, then so too, presumably, is the difference between 
being X and being (X or Y). And if this difference is real, then why shouldn’t we be able to think in 
ways that respect that difference? (Boghossian, 1991, p. 73) 
 
This paragraph introduces several key ideas in the problems we are considering. We 
recognize from the discussion of the Twin cases that there are reasons for thinking that what a 
symbol means may depend on what one thinks fall under the same kind, and, that at least 
some symbols, i.e. symbols that stand for kinds or have the contents of kind terms, get their 
meanings partly from the fact that we can distinguish their referents from other kinds of 
things. We also remember Fodor distinguishing between cases where two kinds are 
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mistakenly taken to be the same as cases where the mistake is accidental and cases where the 
mistake is necessary.  
 
A possibility in this way of setting things up we have not considered yet is the possibility of 
worlds that are too far for us to get to. But what is meant by the phrase “too far for us to get 
to”? Boghossian distinguishes between physically possible worlds and physically possible 
worlds that we can get to (1991, p. 75). As I understand it, the physically possible worlds that 
we can get to are worlds that are physically possible and where the circumstances are such 
that we can survive there. The worlds that are inaccessible to us seem to be worlds, though 
physically possible, where we will not survive in principle, i.e. where our biological and 
medical limitations don’t allow us to go (Boghossian, 1991, p. 75-76).  
 
Boghossian, like Fodor, take natural kind terms to be paradigm examples of terms to be 
considered in the context of naturalization. Boghossian lists some intuitions he thinks are 
plausible when it comes to the semantics of kind terms that Fodor’s theory should account for 
(Boghossian, 1991, p. 74-75). The kind term should be such that (i) “some sort of basic 
naturally explanatory property unite all the things that are correctly said to fall in its 
extension” (Boghossian, 1991, p. 74); (ii) it should be “[t]he kind exemplified by all, or better 
most, of certain local samples” (Boghossian, 1991, p. 74); and (iii) “If investigation uncovers 
that there is no single hidden structure uniting the local samples, but that there are two (or so) 
well-defined such structures, then there appears to be a temptation to say that the expressions 
has both of those structures in its extension” (Boghossian, 1991, p. 75). He also notes that if 
there is no common property at all, only a “messy motley of basic particles” (Boghossian, 
1991, p. 75) in the local samples, then the term fails to refer. He uses ‘jade’ as his example of 
(iii). ‘Jade’ is a kind term that has two chemically different substances in its extension, 
namely jadeite and nephrite (Boghossian, 1991, p. 75), and thus seems to be a disjunctive 
natural kind concept.      
 
These are intuitions that Boghossian argues are plausible, but that information based 
semantics cannot account for. The reason for this is a special case of the Twin Earth case. In 
the normal Twin case we have two substances, H2O and XYZ. The kind term “water” 
functions so as to pick out all the things that are of the same natural kind as the local samples, 
i.e. H2O in the actual world. The normal Twin case we are considering here is no 
counterexample to Fodor’s theory because you can, under the right circumstances, tell H2O 
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and XYZ apart. This is so even though in encountering XYZ one is normally disposed to wall 
it “water”. The circumstances in which you can tell H2O and XYZ apart are circumstances 
humans can survive in, and therefore physically possible in the required sense. Presumably, a 
chemist with the relevant know-how could distinguish them easily. The point is that “water” 
does not have both H2O and XYZ in its extension because the world where we can tell them 
apart is physically accessible to us, and were we to go there and discover that they are 
different substances we would stop using “water” of XYZ. 
 
6.5. ABC 
Now to the main part of Boghossian’s argument. Boghossian wants us to consider a case 
where to distinguish the substances in this manner is not an alternative. In this case, he says 
(Boghossian, 1991, p. 75), we have a substance that is just like H2O and XYZ in having all 
the same macro properties, e.g. you can drink it, it boils at 100°C, fish live in it etc. 
Boghossian calls this substance ABC. The only difference is that the worlds you need to get to 
to distinguish ABC from H2O and XYZ are worlds that you can’t get to, on account of the 
extreme conditions there. The example Boghossian uses is that you can only distinguish ABC 
from H2O in gravitational fields that are characteristic of the insides of black holes, which is a 
place that is physically possible, but also where humans in principle cannot survive. The 
question is if ABC is in the extension of “water”. If it is, then “water” has two distinct kinds 
in its extension and is disjunctive in the same sense as S’ original “cat” concept, i.e. as a 
primitive concept with a disjunctive extension, but with the difference that the mistake is 
necessary.  
 
The role the notion of physics plays in this example is somewhat puzzling, I think. First of all 
we have the difference between physically possible worlds and a subset of these worlds that 
are the physically possible worlds we can get to. This difference, I think, is initially fairly 
intuitive. There are, after all, conceivable circumstances that are physically possible but where 
humans would not survive. And, where humans cannot survive, humans cannot perform 
experiments to show that two things are kind-distinct. And if two things are kind-distinct but 
cannot be verified as such then our language dispositions cannot respect that difference. As 
we have seen, this comes down to which counterfactuals are true of an individual in a world, 
and in these cases it seems that all the counterfactuals that govern the tokening of “water” of 
H2O and not of ABC are false in worlds that can be inhabited by us.  
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But this is a strange view of physics. First of all, it is a view that takes for granted that all 
kind-distinctions must be made on the basis of experiment. This is, as it stands, not 
unreasonable. But in this context this implies that, since there are circumstances where 
humans cannot perform experiments or observations, there are physically possible worlds that 
are impossible to describe in physical language. This follows from Boghossian’s view since 
he claims (i) that ABC is a physical kind, and (ii) that it can in principle not be discovered 
experimentally. Given the premise that kind distinctions must be made on the basis of 
experiment, it follows that on Boghossian’s view, ABC is, though a physical substance, it is 
physically indescribable. ABC is, after all, a substance that we necessarily cannot discover. It 
is also a substance that cannot be discovered indirectly, as it were. To discover something 
indirectly means in this context that you can discover it on the basis of examining your 
existing theory for inconsistencies or weaknesses and, as a solution, we can imagine, postulate 
some theoretical kind that solves the problem. I take it that scientific history is full of this kind 
of indirect discovery. The discovery of Neptune comes to mind as such a case. ABC can in 
principle not be discovered like this. Objects that are discovered indirectly have features that 
are such that they can be discovered, given the right experimental environment. There are no 
experimental environments where ABC can be discovered, by assumption. This, I think, is the 
puzzling part about Boghossian’s thought experiment. What is a physically possible world 
like that contain kinds that cannot, in principle, be described physically? What makes it the 
case that this world can be said to be physically possible? I think it is not unreasonable to say 
that physically possible worlds are worlds where the laws and the individuals subsumed by 
those laws are not inconsistent with some ideal physics humans ideally can provide. I am 
puzzled by that the worlds Boghossian postulates as physically possible does not satisfy this 
condition. If the ABC worlds are worlds that are in principle not describable in even an ideal 
physics, by what criteria are they physically possible? I take Fodor to express a similar worry 
in (Fodor, 1991, p. 275). 
 
This worry can be addressed by relaxing the condition that kind-distinctions must be 
established experimentally. But this is just to relax the condition that the world in which the 
kind-distinction is detectable must be available to us, and, as we have seen, that is a crucial 
premise of Boghossian’s argument. I make this point as an observation and will not pursue it 
here. Fodor also expresses doubts as to whether this feature of the though experiment is 
plausible (Fodor, 1991, p. 275). Let us return to the main argument.   
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6.6. Verificationism and the Actual History Condition 
That informational semantics imply verificationism is something Fodor is explicitly aware of 
(Fodor, 1990, p. 120). In fact he even spells out the argument for it: 
 
Such theories [informational ones] distinguish between concepts only if their tokenings are controlled 
by different laws. Hence only if different counterfactuals are true of their tokenings. Hence only if there 
are (possible) circumstances in which one concept would be caused to be tokened and the other concept 
would not. […] …, i.e. a world where H2O and XYZ are distinguished (a forteriori, a world where H2O 
and XYZ are distinguishable. That is how you get from informational semantics to verificationism. 
Correspondingly, the way you avoid the verificationism is: You relax the demand that semantic 
relations be construed solely by reference to subjunctive conditionals; you let the actual histories of 
tokenings count too. (Fodor, 1990, p. 120) 
 
The verificationist aspects of the theory commits the informational semanticist to the principle 
that ‘If “X” expresses at least X, and if there is a Y which it is not nomologically possible for 
you to distinguish from X, then “X” expresses Y as well as X (e.g., it expresses the disjunctive 
property X or Y.)’ (Fodor, 1990, p. 119). And this is the feature of Fodor’s theory 
Boghossian’s argument seeks to exploit. The problem is that if one cannot distinguish ABC 
from H2O, then both H2O and ABC are in the extension of “water”, and this is intuitively not 
the right result, Boghossian thinks. One of the intuitions we postulated that the theory should 
respect is that kind-terms like’ “water” either picks out something that is exemplified by most 
of the local samples, or it picks out nothing at all. And, it is hard not to agree with Boghossian 
that “water”, intuitively, does not have a disjunctive extension.  
 
Fodor’s response to the verificationism worry is to introduce a new condition he calls “the 
actual history condition”. This condition postulates that if S is to express P then some Ss are 
actually caused by Ps (Fodor, 1990, p. 121). This seems to exclude ABC from the extension 
of “water”: since ABC is only a possible and not actual substance, no “water” token has ever 
been caused by ABC. Given the actual history condition, ABC is thus not in the extension of 
“water”. But the actual history condition has some disadvantages over the pure informational 
approach. One of the great advantages of the informational approach is that it can treat 
uninstantiated properties the same way as it treats instantiated properties. Since all that is 
relevant for the tokening of a symbol is the law that governs the tokening, and that law is 
accounted for in terms of subjunctive conditionals, there is nothing that precludes us from 
accounting for the symbol “unicorn” by saying there is a nomic connection between unicorns 
and “unicorn”s. We can say that “unicorn” means what it does because it would be caused by 
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unicorns if there were any. On the actual history condition this is not an option. Unicorns 
don’t exist and therefore cannot have caused “unicorn” tokens.   
 
As Boghossian points out (Boghossian, 1991, p. 77), this seems to have the consequence that 
there is a connection between being an instantiated property and being the cause of a primitive 
symbol. He says: “… there seems no reason to believe that every concept that has an empty 
extension in the actual world will turn out to be complex.” (Boghossian, 1991, p. 77). This has 
the potential implausible consequence that there is a connection between being an 
uninstantiated property and being a complex symbol. Boghossian thinks Fodor owes an 
argument for the plausibility of this (Boghossian, 1991, p. 77). I do agree with Boghossian 
that Fodor owes an argument for this. But I do not think that it is prima facie not plausible that 
there is a connection between being an instantiated property and being a simple symbol. 
Perhaps one can make a case for the claim that all simple symbols must have a corresponding 
instantiated property. From there one can by deducing that no simple symbol has a 
corresponding uninstantiated property conclude that all uninstantiated properties, if they 
correspond at all, correspond to complex symbols. There is nothing, on the face of it at least, 
why this approach is implausible. 
 
A second difficulty is that it is not obvious that the actual history condition actually solves the 
problem. Boghossian considers the case where ABC actually exists in the actual world, in 
trace amounts (Boghossian, 1991, p. 77-78). The idea is that ABC stands to H2O as iron 
pyrites stands to gold, i.e. as an impurity that is not in the extension of the kind term, but that 
still occasionally is causally responsible for causing the tokening of the kind symbol. So ABC 
exists all around us, we are supposing, but only in trace amounts. We are assuming that this is 
sufficient for that some “water” tokens have actually been caused by ABC, and that this 
satisfies the actual history condition. This seems to imply that “water” has both H2O and ABC 
in its extension, and this is, Boghossian says (1991, p. 78), contrary to intuition, and thus 
constitutes a counterexample to Fodor’s theory. The consequence of this seems to be that the 
actual history condition doesn’t produce the effect Fodor hopes, namely to secure univocal 
content ascriptions even in cases where one cannot verify that the asymmetrical dependence 
base consists of a single law. This constitutes Boghossian’s full argument against Fodor’s 
view. I do not think that Fodor can reply effectively to this challenge, and in considering 
Fodor’s response I will try to formulate why.  
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6.7. Fodor’s Response 
How does Fodor respond to this argument? Fodor responds by attacking the argument that 
shows that the asymmetric theory is a type I theory, i.e. the crucial premise of Boghossian’s 
argument. We remember that the argument tries to show this by showing that the only 
plausible alternative to the world where P  S is the only S causing law is not available as an 
asymmetric dependency base. The thought is that if the asymmetric dependency base of all 
the laws that causes S is defined as a world where the only cause of S is P, then, that is in 
effect to say that this world is a situation where the only thing that can cause a symbol is its 
referent. This is, as we saw, equivalent to the definition of a type I situation. If Fodor can 
undermine this argument he has shown that his theory is not a type I theory.  
 
For Fodor to undermine the argument he must show that Boghossian’s argument does not 
force him to accept the conclusion, i.e. that the asymmetric dependence base for S is a world 
where the only thing that can cause S is P, which is the referent of S. He must do this because 
the alternative is to admit that the theory is a type I theory. Boghossian’s argument consists in 
assuming that Fodor denies this conclusion and then considering Fodor’s options. Boghossian 
thinks Fodor has one option, namely to insist upon “a distribution of nearby worlds which 
contains worlds in which P and Q can cause S tokens, and worlds in which both P and R can, 
but no world in which only P can and no world in which only non-Ps can, …” (Boghossian, 
1991, p. 72). But this is tantamount to saying that the asymmetric dependence base for S 
tokens is (P & R) v (P & Q), which does not yield P as the unique cause of S tokens, and 
hence not the meaning of S. Boghossian concludes, reasonably, that Fodor’s theory is a type I 
theory because the only alternative specification of asymmetric dependence bases is not 
sufficient for producing robustness. This, we remember is the chief condition a theory of 
meaning must satisfy. 
 
As we have set up the argument here it seems reasonable that the way for Fodor to disarm the 
argument is either to show that there is indeed a way of specifying the asymmetric 
dependence base for S other than by specifying a world where the only cause of S is P, which 
amounts to finding a better alternative than Boghossian’s alternative, or by somehow denying 
that the way we have set up type I theories here is in fact what is meant by type I theory. 
These, as far as I can tell, are the only options for countering Boghossian’s objection.  
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Fodor chooses a different strategy, one I find puzzling. Call the law (P & R) v (P & Q)  S 
for C. We remember that C is Boghossian’s alternative asymmetric dependence base to 
admitting an asymmetric dependence base that is equivalent to a type I situation. As we have 
been setting things up, we have found reason to accept that C is the most plausible alternative 
Fodor has other than admitting to a type I theory. To accept that C is the asymmetric 
dependence base for S is, of course, to admit that S means something disjunctive, but this is 
presumably a problem that could be solved by the actual history condition. So, admitting that 
C is an alternative to P as the asymmetric dependence base for S tokens is presumably not 
fatal to Fodor’s theory.  
 
The puzzling part about Fodor’ reply is that this is not the approach he takes. Fodor argues 
against that C should be regarded as a candidate for the asymmetric dependency base for S 
(Fodor, 1991, p. 273), and he does so very convincingly. He says this: 
 
Notice, to begin with, that for S to mean P in this world, P  S has to be (not just true but) lawful in 
(relevant) worlds where other X  S laws fail. The argument for this is straightforward. The intuition 
that underlies the asymmetric dependence story is that S’s meaning P depends on P  S but not on any 
other X  S connections. But this implies that any other X  S can fail consonant with whatever is 
required for S to mean P. But for S to mean P, Ss must carry information about P; and Ss to carry 
information about P, [P  S] has to be a law. So X isn’t a candidate for what S means in Wi unless X 
 S is a law in Wi. So, then, the question arises whether we’re guaranteed that C is a law in W1 and W2; 
and the answer is that we aren’t. (Fodor, 1991, p. 273) 
 
There are two main reasons why C is likely not to be a law (Fodor, 1991, p. 273). The first 
reason is one we looked at when we considered whether proximal causes could be the 
antecedents of laws. Fodor considers the disjunctive antecedents of such laws to be subject to 
the same considerations that makes proximal causes not eligible as antecedents in laws, 
namely that the disjunctions are open. He does not say why he thinks this is so, and I don’t 
quite see how the cases are connected. But, we will not pursue the matter more here. The 
second reason is that it seems that Boghossian makes some assumptions about what laws 
imply, assumptions Fodor can deny. Fodor (1991, p. 273) takes Boghossian to assume that the 
inference from if X  S and Y  S are laws to the conclusion that it follows that X & Y  S 
is a law holds. Fodor makes the observation that “ceteris paribus laws are notorious for not 
satisfying this pattern of inference” (1991, p. 273) as an example to show that the inference is 
likely not to hold. This is, I think, a valid concern on Fodor’s part, but I do not think he 
conclusively shows that there cannot be a law like C that has a disjunctive antecedent that 
satisfies both the condition that it should be a proper law, and that its antecedent is not open. 
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What is confusing in this discussion, I think, is the dialectic of the exchange between Fodor 
and Boghossian. Fodor says:  
 
I conclude that Boghossian has given us no reason to believe that C will be a candidate for determining 
the meaning of S whenever P  S is a candidate for determining the meaning of S. From which I further 
conclude that Boghossian has given us no reason for supposing that the asymmetric dependence story is 
committed to type I situations. (Fodor, 1991, p. 273 – 274) 
 
The puzzlement stems from the fact that this conclusion does not seem to follow from the way 
we have set up Boghossian’s argument. We have considered C as the only plausible 
alternative Fodor has as an asymmetric dependence base if Fodor wants to deny that his 
theory is not a type I theory. It seems that C, being a law that secures that Ps can cause Ss 
without relying upon specifying a situation or world where the only thing that can cause Ss is 
Ps, is a candidate Fodor can employ to demonstrate that his theory in fact is not a type I 
theory. Instead, Fodor seems to treat Boghossian’s argument as a disjunction problem where 
he needs to dispel the disjunction, something he arguably succeeds in doing. But, in doing so 
he does not actually answer Boghossian’s objection. Boghossian’s objection, as we have seen, 
assumes that Fodor wants do deny that his theory is a type I theory. This implies, Boghossian 
believes, that one needs another way of specifying the asymmetric dependence base of a 
symbol than appealing to the nearest possible world in which all S tokens are caused by Ps, 
since this proposal is equivalent to the type I way of specifying the asymmetric dependence 
base. Boghossian then considers what he thinks is the most plausible option and argues that it 
also is insufficient for being the asymmetric dependence base for S tokens. In effect, 
Boghossian wants to show that specifying a situation (world) where all S tokens are caused by 
Ps, i.e. being a type I theory, follows necessarily from Fodor’s theory of asymmetric 
dependence, because no other option is available for specifying the required asymmetric 
dependence base.  
 
The reason why Fodor’s reply is puzzling, I think, is that Fodor does nothing to counter 
Boghossian’s argument. He, in fact, strengthens it by adding arguments to why Boghossian’s 
alternative to being a type I theory is flawed. If ‘We want it to come out that [“cow”] means 
[cow] because cowhood is the only property whose instances cause “cow”s in every world 
where anything does’ (Fodor, 1991, p. 273) which is Fodor’s revised condition after he has 
replied to Boghossian’s objection, unpacks as something other than “… (i) in W, cows cause 
“cow”s and non-cows don’t; and (ii) W is nearer to our world than any in which some non-
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cows cause “cow”s and no cows do” (Fodor, quoted in Boghossian, 1991, p. 71), which is 
how Boghossian’s argument presupposes that it does not, then Fodor owes an argument for 
the difference, I think. In the next section we will consider some difficulties relating to relying 
on distances between possible worlds in specifying the correct asymmetric dependence bases. 
As we will see, Boghossian argues that such distances cannot be specified naturalistically. 
 
6.8. The Distance Metric 
We mentioned above that there are problems connected to the theory’s modal aspects, and 
especially connected to the conception of distance between various possible worlds. 
Boghossian is skeptical about whether the relevant “nearness”-relation can be specified non-
question-beggingly, i.e. in non-semantic and non-intentional terms (Boghossian, 1991, p. 81). 
He formulates the problem like this:  
 
Clearly, everything depends on whether the relevant similarity relation can be specified non-question-
beggingly – without the benefit of sidelong looks at the meanings of the expressions in question. What 
the success of Fodor’s theory depends on, in other words, is that when nearness of worlds is judged 
from a purely non-semantic and non-intentional – for our purposes, therefore, from a purely physical – 
point of view, the H2O-only world always turns out to be closer than the XYZ-only world. Will this be 
true? (Boghossian, 1991, p. 81) 
 
It is important to note here that Boghossian takes himself to have shown that Fodor’s theory is 
a type I theory where “to say that P is an asymmetric dependence base for S is simply to say 
that P is the sole cause of S tokens in the closest world where S has a single cause” 
(Boghossian, 1991, p. 81, my italics). Above, we saw reason to believe that Fodor must accept 
this conclusion. So there are worlds where the only law that govern S tokens is P  S, and 
these worlds are the ones that are the candidates for being the asymmetric dependence base 
for S. The one of these that is the closest to the actual world is the one that is the asymmetric 
dependence base for S. But by what principle should we decide the distances between these 
worlds? We said in the beginning of this chapter that it is the changes one must make to get to 
a world that are important in this context.  
 
Fodor has an account of this procedure (quoted in Boghossian, 1991, p. 83) which we will 
review. The question is: why does “water” track H2O and not XYZ? What do we need to 
change to make it the case that “water” tracks H2O and not XYZ? Kind terms are, as we have 
seen, governed by our dispositions and what we can distinguish between. Let us consider a 
world where we can infallibly tell H2O and XYZ apart. What do we need to change to make 
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this the case? We could perhaps make it so that XYZ has a particular color or smell that 
makes it instantly recognizable. This world will then be a world in which our “water” tokens 
track H2O and not XYZ. Next we will consider what needs to be the case for “water” tokens 
to track XYZ and not H2O. Plausibly we need to change the world enough that the different 
substances are recognizably different, e.g. by introducing some distinguishing feature, like in 
the previous world. And, in addition to this, we need to change our dispositions, i.e. we need 
to change such that we are disposed to use “water” for XYZ and not H2O. The important point 
is that we need to change more to get “water” to track XYZ (i.e. make XYZ and H2O 
distinguishable, and change our disposition to token “water” of XYZ) than to make it track 
H2O (to make H2O and XYZ distinguishable). Since we need to change more to get to an 
XYZ world than to an H2O world, the H2O world is closer and “water” has H2O in its 
extension. This way of specifying distances between possible worlds is Fodor’s. Boghossian 
seems to say that this way is question-begging and not naturalistic. Let us try to specify why 
he thinks so. 
 
We have seen that “water” tokens H2O and not XYZ because we need to make more changes 
to get to the world where “water” is tokened only by XYZ (a world where the substances are 
obviously distinguished and that our dispositions are different) than we need to make to get to 
the world where “water” is tokened only by H2O (only that the substances are distinguished). 
So it seems that the H2O world is closer on account of the fewer changes needed to get there, 
and that explains why “water” means H2O and not XYZ. 
 
Boghossian objects that this way of specifying the distance between worlds is question 
begging (Boghossian, 1991, p. 82-83). His point is that it is not obvious that particular 
physical changes and intentional changes are equally big changes i.e. that they count for as 
much as the other changes. Fodor seems to think of the changes individually as having the 
same value as any other change. This has the obvious advantage of allowing distances 
between worlds to be accounted for quantitatively. And this, it seems, is what Fodor does. As 
we have seen, the XYZ world is farther away from the actual world than the H2O world 
because to get to the XYZ world you need to make two changes (make XYZ uniquely 
detectable, and change our dispositions), whereas to get to the H2O world you only need to 
make one (make H2O uniquely detectable).  
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Boghossian’s point is that this way of looking at changes is not very plausible. He makes the 
observation that to make H2O infallibly detectable from XYZ one only needs to change H2O 
in such a way so that it has some property that is instantly recognizable (Boghossian, 1991, p. 
82). One does not also need to make XYZ infallibly detectable from anything else. He 
continues by saying that making these changes depends, from a physical perspective, not only 
on our detecting capabilities, but also on the chemistry of the substances. From this it is 
reasonable to infer that some substances will be easier than others to change in such a way as 
to imprint them with a property that is instantly recognizable by us. This seems to show that 
physical changes cannot be regarded as equal in such a way as to license a quantitative 
account of distance between worlds in the way we have seen that Fodor does. Boghossian 
continues by presenting the following case. He assumes that XYZ has been made uniquely 
identifiable by an alteration of our sensory apparatus that is such that XYZ smells horrible. 
H2O is not identifiable in the same manner, and can be confused with other substances that 
have similar traits. It is also assumed that the change that made XYZ instantly recognizable is 
a very small physical change. The change needed to make H2O instantly recognizable is 
assumed to be a complicated affair, implying bigger changes needed than the XYZ case. 
Boghossian poses the following question: 
 
To get, then, from our world – in which “water” means H2O – to a world in which “water” gets applied 
only to H2O, you have to make a big physical change; to get to a world in which it gets applied only to 
XYZ, you have to make a physical change and a small intentional change. Now: which world is closer 
to ours? (Boghossian, 1991, p. 82-83) 
 
He continues by concluding that the only way of getting the desired result – that the H2O 
world comes out as closer than the XYZ world – one needs to assume that “all physical 
changes are on par, and every intentional change counts for as much as every physical 
change.” (Boghossian, 1991, p. 83). This is non-naturalistic in the following sense: Fodor’s 
argument depends on the physical changes being on par because then the intentional change 
can settle the question of which world is closer. But, as Boghossian’s argument show, there is 
reason to believe that physical changes are not on par, so that situations where Fodor’s theory 
yields the wrong results are possible.  
 
Fodor responds to this argument by stressing that the laws in these cases are ceteris paribus 
laws and that this changes the case. He says: 
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What’s needed is that each world in which H2O and XYZ is distinguishable and we apply ‘water’ to 
H2O but not to XYZ is closer to us than the world that is closest to it in which H2O and XYZ are 
distinguishable and we apply ‘water’ to XYZ but not to H2O. (This is a way of saying that ceteris 
paribus worlds in which water rules are closer to us than corresponding worlds in which XYZ does.) 
Any adequate distance measure should have this property because, as we’ve seen, you have to change 
more things to get to XYZ-but-not-H2O) [sic] worlds than you do to get to H2O-but-not-XYZ worlds. 
And though, as Boghossian very properly reminds us, it is not required that the more things you have to 
change to get to a world, the further away that world has to be, it is required that the more things you 
have to change to get to a world, the further away that world has to be ceteris paribus. (Fodor, 1991, p. 
276-277) 
 
Fodor seems to be saying that the reason Boghossian’s case yields the wrong result is that he 
does not take in to account that the laws in question are ceteris paribus laws. The feature of 
ceteris paribus laws that make it the case that Boghossian’s example does not apply is not 
easy to understand, and I am a little puzzled by this. I do not quite understand what good it 
does to make the distance metric to be a relation between A – B and B – C instead of A – B 
and  A – C. Actually, I think there is an ambiguity in how the distance metric is articulated in 
the quote above. This is something I think can have serious implications for Fodor’s theory, 
but we will only consider it superficially here. Let’s suppose the actual world is A, the H2O 
world is B and the XYZ world is C. Now, as we remember, the question we want an answer 
to is this: why does “water” mean H2O and not XYZ?  
 
I claim that there are two ways of understanding Fodor’s account in the quote above: The A – 
B distance is less than the B – C distance. We are imagining that C is the closest world where 
XYZ causes “water” tokens in relation to B. The ambiguity arises from the fact that Fodor 
doesn’t say if the distance that matters is in relation to A or not. And there is no reason to 
assume, since we are dealing with ceteris paribus laws that can cancel each other out, that the 
worlds we are considering are arranged linearly. It is in the cases where they are not that the 
ambiguity becomes relevant. If the A – B distance is less than the B – C distance and it is 
these two distances that matter, then the case comes out right. This, however, implies the 
assumption that possible worlds are arranged linearly, an assumption that is in need of an 
argument. If the distances that matter are in relation to A and the worlds are arranged linearly 
then C is further away from A then B as a trivial fact, and there seems to be no reason to 
express it like Fodor does. But if the worlds are not arranged linearly, as is possible since 
ceteris paribus laws can cancel each other out, and we resolve the ambiguity by postulating 
that it is in fact the relation to A that matters, then the possibility arises that even though B – 
C is greater that A – B, A – C can still be less of a distance than A – B. This has the plausible 
consequence that the XYZ world can still be closer than the H2O world. This is, in my 
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opinion, a result Fodor cannot tolerate. If it is true that this result only can be avoided by 
assuming that possible worlds are arranged linearly I think it is a result that comes at a price 
for Fodor. Intuitively I do not think it is plausible that possible worlds are arranges in a strict, 
linear way. This assumption will also imply that Fodor must provide a naturalistic and non-
question begging account of the arrangement of possible worlds that has the result that they 
are arranged linearly. I do not think such an account is forthcoming. 
 
6.9. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have primarily focused on Boghossian’s argument against Fodor. The 
argument aims to show that Fodor’s theory of asymmetric dependence is a type I theory in 
disguise. We have seen reasons in support of this claim. We also reviewed Fodor’s reply to 
this objection and found it lacking in that it seems to address something else than what we 
have taken Boghossian’s argument to be. From this I think it is reasonable to conclude that 
Fodor’s reply to Boghossian is not successful in dispelling the worry the argument poses, and 
that the argument poses a considerable challenge to Fodor’s account. Boghossian’s argument 
poses several worries about Fodor’s theory’s ability to account for what we have said are the 
three main intuitions we have about a naturalistic theory of meaning: the intuition that the 
theory should be naturalistic, that it should construe meaning as robust, and that it should not 
construe meaning as being ubiquitous, i.e. everywhere. Mainly, Boghossian’s objection 
challenges Fodor’s theory’s account of the robustness of meaning in that it claims to show 
that the theory will always ascribe disjunctive extensions to symbols. It also challenges the 
theory’s virtue of being naturalistic in that it claims that Fodor cannot get the right content 
ascriptions unless he makes assumptions about how to arrange the possible worlds, 
assumptions that Boghossian claims are question-begging and non-naturalistic. We have also 
seen some evidence for this claim. I think that what we have considered in this chapter 
suggests that Fodor’s theory has severe problems to tackle before it can claim to have 
succeeded in naturalizing intentionality and meaning.  
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Summary and Conclusions 
 
At the outset we identified three things we pre-theoretically and intuitively think a theory of 
meaning should account for. Two of these intuitions are explicit features of meaning: that 
meaning is not everywhere (the disproval of pan-semanticism) and that meaning is robust 
(that the meanings of things are insensitive to, for example, what causes them). The third 
intuition is a more general intuition about how the world is. It is the intuition that everything 
that exists, in some form or other, is physical. This is the intuition which is the basis of what 
we have been calling physicalism. I called this a more general intuition because it applies to 
not only meaning and intentionality but to all things. Physicalism implies that also the rest of 
the mental, including consciousness, in some form or other, is physical. And everything that is 
physical in this sense should, in principle, be accounted for naturalistically. Fodor’s theory, as 
we have seen, does not attempt to account for the rest of the mental or consciousness, only for 
meaning and intentionality. 
 
On this background we can see that Fodor’s project of trying to naturalize meaning and 
intentionality by providing a naturalistic theory of content is an extremely ambitious project, 
but a project that must be attempted if one is convinced that everything that exists is physical, 
in some form or other. 
 
It is perhaps the requirement that the theory should be naturalistic that Fodor’s theory satisfies 
best of the three requirements, or intuitions. In part I we saw that, by using a notion such as 
information, the Fodor’s theory is specified in naturalistic terms. As we saw in the discussion 
of the historical/teleological theory Fodor’s theory has the advantage of not having to assume 
something like the teleological notion of biological function. We saw that Fodor’s reasons for 
finding an alternative solution to the disjunction problem that does not involve a principled 
distinction between type I and type II situations are sound. His rejection of this distinction is, 
as we saw, motivated by considerations about robustness.  
 
In part II we have seen Fodor’s own proposal for solving the disjunction problem. His 
asymmetric dependence theory does seem to account for many cases of the disjunction 
problem, but as we saw when we considered Boghossian’s objection there are reasons to 
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believe that it cannot account for all. I do think that some of these considerations pose severe 
difficulties for Fodor.  
 
In conclusion I would like to observe that though we have concluded here that Fodor’s theory 
does not account for the three main intuitions in a satisfactory manner, we have not shown 
that Fodor’s theory, suitably revised, cannot meet the requirements we have posed. In fact I 
do believe that Fodor’s theory is the best theory available that aims to naturalize meaning. It 
succeeds in accounting for many things in this context, but not everything it sets out to do. As 
we observed above, we must assess Fodor’s theory in relation to the ambition of the project. 
In this case the project is to place the mind, and everything else, where it belongs, namely in 
nature. 
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